Reviving the Declaratory Judgment: A New Path to Structural Reform by Chiang, Emily
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 63 Number 3 Article 4 
5-1-2015 
Reviving the Declaratory Judgment: A New Path to Structural 
Reform 
Emily Chiang 
S.J. Quinney College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Emily Chiang, Reviving the Declaratory Judgment: A New Path to Structural Reform, 63 Buff. L. Rev. 549 
(2015). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol63/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
549 
Reviving the Declaratory Judgment: A New 
Path to Structural Reform 
EMILY CHIANG† 
INTRODUCTION 
We stand on the cusp of a new era in public interest 
litigation, one that has been several decades in the making 
and one that will shape the future of structural reform for 
years to come. After sixty years of being defined—and 
constrained—by Brown v. Board of Education,1 it is time to 
move on to a new way of doing justice. This Article will begin 
the task of describing the shift in the making and urge 
reformers to take note, lest they lose the opportunity to help 
shape the institutional litigation of the future. 
The giants of public interest legal scholarship, Abram 
Chayes and Owen Fiss, catalogued the first major shift in 
legal practice and philosophy, from a private rights dispute 
resolution model to a public law litigation model.2 That shift, 
which began with Brown, has defined two generations of 
legal practice, informing how both academics and 
practitioners think about institutional reform and civil 
rights. But all good things must come to an end, and so too, 
the Brown-defined era of public interest litigation centered 
around the structural injunction. 
Reformers and courts have begun to engage in new ways 
of transforming institutions. Some aspects of the change in 
the air are already evident in the existing literature, which 
  
† Associate Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law. Many thanks to 
Jessica Horton for her invaluable research assistance and to Margo Schlanger, 
Dennis Parker, and Andy Hessick for their comments. 
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 2. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, 
1978 Term]. 
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describes a movement away from judge-centered injunctive 
relief towards a “new governance” in the form of more 
multilateral—and experimental—ways of fixing our most 
troubled social institutions.3 Other aspects have yet to 
develop. This Article contends that (for better or worse) 
structural reform litigation as Professors Fiss and Chayes 
knew it has jumped the proverbial shark. It urges reformers 
to adapt, and to overhaul that which is firmly in their 
control—their requests for relief—or face the risk of being left 
behind. If reformers fail to adjust their pleadings and 
practice, the forces that have long pressed the decline in the 
traditional model of structural reform litigation will likely 
have their way.  
Although lawyers continue to request injunctive relief 
and courts continue to grant it, this model of reform faces 
increasing and inexorable pressure to change, both 
doctrinally and culturally. Judicial minimalism and 
separation of powers ideologies are ascendant, and the 
paradigm of the judge as savior of the downtrodden and 
bringer of justice is in marked decline. As some scholars have 
already identified, new practices are emerging. Charles 
Sabel, William Simon, and Michael Dorf, for example, have 
written compellingly about the rise of experimentalism, 
wherein lower courts act on a smaller scale and encourage 
greater stakeholder participation in reform.4 Margo 
Schlanger has argued that the traditional judge-centric 
understanding of structural reform is overly narrow and fails 
to take into account the multilateral nature of institutional 
reform.5 Others have described a change in the nature of the 
  
 3. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 877-78 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270 (1998); 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance 
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-50 (2004); Charles F. 
Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (2011); Margo Schlanger, Beyond the 
Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 
2000-01 (1999) [hereinafter Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge]. 
 4. See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.  
 5. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. 
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structural injunctions issued to become narrower and more 
focused on “outputs” than “inputs.”6 
To these observations, this Article adds the following: the 
emerging era of reform is defined by the fact that modern 
litigation is neither filed nor proceeds with the single-minded 
goal of procuring a structural injunction, but is rather 
intended to provide the leverage needed for negotiation with 
defendants; that just as the structural injunction is no longer 
the centerpiece of litigation, litigation is no longer the 
centerpiece of structural reform; and that repeat players, like 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and large law 
firms, who increasingly drive structural reform have become 
too reliant on a cumbersome model of litigation.7 
The new era of reform remains protean and institutional 
reform has not yet been completely foreclosed. New 
governance describes one aspect of the new era, but 
reformers—and litigators in particular—can still change the 
template by which systemic change is procured. This Article 
urges public interest lawyers to reconsider and repurpose a 
long overlooked remedy: the declaratory judgment. 
Declaratory judgments are currently an after-thought in 
public interest litigation, routinely appended onto claims 
that seek structural injunctive relief with little 
consideration. This approach devalues and arguably 
eliminates the need for declaratory relief, which is uniquely 
suited as a tool for structural reform in our age—and 
theoretically, at least, easier to procure than injunctions.  
The declaratory judgment is a remedy with which even 
the most ardent judicial minimalists should be comfortable: 
it can provide the same leverage to drive negotiation as a 
request for a structural injunction and it can make the reform 
process more efficient and cost-effective, and thereby more 
available. Perhaps most importantly, it neatly dovetails the 
temperament of the modern reform era besotted with new 
governance—which seeks to replace judicial majesty with 
multilateral stakeholder involvement—but stays rooted in 
the exigencies of actual litigation practice. It is fully capable 
  
 6. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2004) [hereinafter 
Sabel & Simon, Destabilization]. 
 7. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. 
552 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63  
of creating the space needed for the many facets of 
institutional reform we still require. 
This Article urges litigators to let go of the traditional 
telling of the Brown v. Board of Education story—as the case 
that ushered in a brave new world of reform litigation 
centered on the structural injunction—and to welcome a new 
telling of the Brown story.8 This retelling of Brown is a fuller 
and richer tale, which includes both Browns I and II as well 
as the years in between. It is one that shifts the emphasis 
away from the structural injunction and towards the need for 
remedies that prod the political branches to take action. It is 
one that values political and judicial expediency, efficiency in 
the use of limited resources, and practical impact over 
traditional pathways.  
Some may consider this proposal threatening, or even 
dangerous, because it requires a certain surrender of control 
and may produce unpredictable results. But negotiated 
settlement has always been the true goal of institutional 
reform litigation and litigators would do well to “think 
outside of the regulatory tool box,” identifying new and 
improved ways to drive defendants to the bargaining table.9 
Part I of the Article provides a brief summary of the 
traditional model for structural reform, decoupling the right 
at stake from the remedy traditionally sought, treating the 
paradigmatic case for reform separately from the structural 
injunction. Part II explores the new era in public interest 
litigation confronting courts and reformers today. It begins 
with the premise of a decline in the traditional structural 
injunction model, summarizes the current scholarship on the 
experimentalism and multilateralism that have evolved to 
fill the void, and identifies other critical aspects of the new 
reform. Part III introduces the declaratory judgment as a 
powerful and heretofore unconsidered vehicle for change, one 
that is both consistent with the separationist forces that have 
pressed the decline of the old reform model and one that 
  
 8. Cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the 
Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 9 (1994) (arguing that Brown was 
“directly responsible for only the most token forms of southern public school 
desegregation”). 
 9. Lobel, supra note 3, at 367. 
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offers increased efficiencies and doctrinal advantages. 
Finally, Part IV examines the declaratory judgment in 
action, exploring how the strategic use of declaratory 
judgments can streamline and make more effective systemic 
reform litigation in the real world.  
I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF STRUCTURAL REFORM  
As long as social institutions exist, there will be a need 
for institutional reform, but the means by which that reform 
takes place need not be static. This Part begins with the 
foundations first laid by Chayes and Fiss in the commentary 
and by Brown in the doctrine. It will first describe that which 
we cannot change—the underlying case demanding 
institutional reform—and then that which we can—the way 
in which institutional reform litigators have thus far chosen 
to meet that challenge. The point of this Part is to begin the 
process of decoupling these two: to recognize that the right is 
neither interchangeable nor inextricably intertwined with 
the remedy. 
A.  The Paradigmatic Structural Reform Case  
The structural, or administrative, injunction has long 
been the gold standard for a certain type of civil rights action: 
cases involving rights violations by an institution 
unresponsive to political reform.10 These cases typically have 
several common (and related) characteristics, inherent to the 
nature of the problem they present. First, they involve rights 
violations that result from the structure of an institution 
rather than individual “one-off” rights violations.11 School 
desegregation remains the paradigmatic example of this 
characteristic: no amount of individual damages awards 
could remediate the problem, which required a prospective 
structural remedy rather than individual retrospective relief. 
  
 10. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1144 (1977) 
[hereinafter Fiss, Dombrowski] (describing the administrative injunction as one 
that “attempts to change actual behavior,” as when it “seeks to reorganize an 
ongoing social institution”). 
 11. See, e.g., Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 18. 
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The need for institutional reform arises from a failure of the 
institution writ large. 
Second, the institution in question has failed to meet 
applicable legal standards.12 Some scholars have 
characterized this element as “the least controversial aspect 
of institutional reform adjudication,” contending that “[o]ften 
the plaintiff’s claim that the institution fails to meet 
minimum standards is uncontested.”13 Although this 
observation may hold true in some contexts and with respect 
to some institutional defendants, it is often not the case, 
particularly in the context of the areas of reform discussed 
below, which have been subject to extensive litigation on the 
liability front. In fact, it is precisely the refusal to concede 
liability that engenders the costly litigation this Article urges 
reformers to streamline and minimize, so that resources that 
might otherwise be spent defending a case may instead be 
invested in the institution that is the subject of litigation. 
Third, these problems are typically what Michael Dorf 
calls “big cases,” or those that “tax the administrative 
capacities of courts,”14 as opposed to hard cases, which 
  
 12. Owen Fiss describes the institutions in question as constituting “a new unit 
of constitutional law—the state bureaucracy.” Id. at 4; see also id. at 22 (“The 
focus is on a social condition, not incidents of wrongdoing, and also on the 
bureaucratic dynamics that produce that condition.”). Charles Sabel and William 
Simon describe these problems as having “two elements: failure to meet 
standards and political blockage.” Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, 
at 1062. 
 13. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1062-63; see also id. at 
1065 (“[D]efendants, or important constituents within the defendant institutions, 
are often sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims. Even more often, defendants 
welcome the new resources that the decree induces nonparty governmental and 
private sources to volunteer.”); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s 
Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
1121, 1167 (1996) (“Although state officials are often the ones who violated the 
Constitution in the first place, remedies often can be implemented by other state 
governmental organs that were either unaware of the violations or that have 
experienced a change of heart.”). This Article is not as sanguine. 
 14. Dorf, supra note 3, at 973. Myriam Gilles similarly describes these cases as 
requiring “breadth and depth,” in the form of broad consensus that a problem 
exists and a depth of passion about resolving it. Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the 
Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 
147-48 (2003). 
2015]    REVIVING THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 555 
typically implicate moral controversy.15 Relatedly, they also 
tend to be “polycentric” in nature.16 They present a variety of 
interrelated problems and the solutions are accordingly 
complex and interrelated as well. There are multiple moving 
parts, as with the classic example of allocating resources 
under a fixed budget.17 It is difficult to solve one piece of the 
problem without affecting other portions of the institution—
or other institutions—which may or may not themselves be 
the subject of litigation or the target of reform. 
Finally, these problems are resistant to being solved by 
the political process.18 They are extensive and complicated 
(and often expensive to resolve) which is why they tend to 
persist even where there is widespread acknowledgment that 
the problem exists.19 And, moreover, those affected by the 
institution’s failure to meet standards often lack political 
power. They are often poor, of color, and/or literally 
disenfranchised because they are too young to vote, are 
felons, or are incarcerated.20 Sometimes they are all of these 
things at once. Neither the political branches nor 
administrative agencies are typically inclined to take these 
issues on without external prodding. 
  
 15. Dorf, supra note 3, at 972-73; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 
1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 49-50 
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, 1995 Term]. 
 16. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional 
Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 645-47 (1982) (describing 
legal and non-legal polycentricity); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-96 (1978) (describing polycentric tasks). 
 17. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1058. 
 18. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law 
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 247, 288 (1988) (noting the “numerous obstacles to legislative 
action, the most important of which are the power of inertia, the lack of time, and 
the futility of all-encompassing statutory codes”). 
 19. Cf. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1092 (“[I]t is 
remarkable how rarely the practices that the plaintiffs attack seem to have been 
the result of an exercise of authority by anyone. The situation is more often the 
consequence of a failure or refusal to make policy.”).  
 20. Cf. id. at 1064 (noting that one premise of public law reform cases “involves 
majoritarian political control unresponsive to the interests of a vulnerable, 
stigmatized minority”). 
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B.  The Paradigmatic Institutional Reform Remedy: the 
Structural Injunction 
Much as Brown presented the paradigmatic case for 
structural reform, the court-imposed solution in Brown 
became the paradigmatic remedy for structural reform.21 
Plaintiffs’ side litigators came to see every case presenting 
the need for structural reform as one in which a structural 
injunction should be sought and judges often complied.22 
Brown was a true touchstone.23 As Fiss notes, “Brown was 
accepted into the legal and popular culture as legitimate, so 
much so that it began to function as an axiom. . . . As a 
consequence federal court access was assumed for 
administrative decrees reaching state prisons and mental 
hospitals, public housing projects, and local police 
departments.”24 
In his groundbreaking article, The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation, Chayes describes an evolution from 
the traditional conception of adjudication—which was 
bipolar, retrospective, and self-contained, as with contracts 
  
 21. As Donald Horowitz puts it, “Brown created a magnetic field around the 
courts . . . .” Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial 
Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1281 (1983); see also Fiss, 
1978 Term, supra note 2, at 2 (“As a genre of constitutional litigation, structural 
reform has its roots in the Warren Court era and the extraordinary effort to 
translate the rule of Brown v. Board of Education into practice.”); Paul Gewirtz, 
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588 (1983) (“The very evolution of this 
extraordinary remedial weapon, now central to the modern conception of judicial 
power, is inseparable from the desegregation effort and resistance to 
it. . . . [J]udicial remedies became so intrusive largely because public resistance 
precluded alternative methods for making Brown a reality.”). 
 22. See Yoo, supra note 13, at 1124 (“In 1994, federal court orders regulated 
the conditions of confinement in 244 prisons in thirty-four different jurisdictions 
. . . . [H]undreds of school districts remain under federal court order. . . . At one 
point in the 1970s, it appears that federal courts had taken control 
simultaneously of Alabama’s schools, mental hospitals, and prisons.”).  
 23. Indeed, Brown continues to serve as a touchstone in the context of the fight 
for marriage equality for gays, in both the social and academic commentary. See, 
e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial 
Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 128-29 (2013). 
 24. Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1149 (footnote omitted). 
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or property disputes—to public law litigation.25 This new 
litigation had a more complicated party structure: an 
adversary relationship that was “suffused and intermixed 
with negotiating and mediating processes at every point,” 
and a judge who presided majestically over the whole 
sprawling mess.26 The end goal of the process was a 
structural injunction: “the centerpiece of the . . . public law 
model.”27 
Fiss similarly describes the structural injunction as 
essential to the resolution of a case presenting a need for 
structural reform: 
[T]he remedy at issue in a structural case is the injunction, and it 
does not require a judgment about wrongdoing, future or past. The 
structural suit seeks to eradicate an ongoing threat to our 
constitutional values and the injunction can serve as the formal 
mechanism by which the court issues directives as to how that is to 
be accomplished. It speaks to the future. The prospective quality of 
the injunction, plus the fact that it fuses power in the judge, 
explains the preeminence of the injunction in structural reform.28 
Although Fiss notes in passing that “some other remedies 
(e.g., declaratory judgments, conditional habeas corpus) have 
many of the same qualities as the injunction, for example, its 
prospectivity, and could be expected to be found in structural 
suits,” his focus (and that of the courts) is on the injunction.29  
Fiss adds that the injunction is predicated on legislative 
failure; judges must act because the legislature is either 
  
 25. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1281-84. 
 26. Id. at 1284; see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 
(1982) (identifying and critiquing the phenomenon of managerial judging); cf. 
ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS 
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 109-10 (2003) [hereinafter SANDLER & 
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY] (“Judicial enforcement has gone from being a 
declaration of rights to a managerial process. As a result, the courts have found 
themselves up to their necks in budgetary, personnel, regulatory, and 
programmatic choices of the kind previously made only by elected state and local 
officials and their appointees.”). 
 27. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1298. 
 28. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 23. 
 29. Id. at 23 n.50. 
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unwilling or unable to do so.30 The judge must, moreover, act 
for as long as her involvement is required, which may be 
quite a while indeed. Per Fiss, the remedial phase in 
structural litigation is by nature and of necessity prolonged, 
“invariably result[ing] in a series of interventions—cycle 
after cycle of supplemental relief.”31 The judge’s task is to 
manage the issue and retain jurisdiction “as long as the 
threat [to constitutional values] persists.”32 To these 
observations about the nature of the injunction, others have 
added: they are extensive and affirmative in their commands; 
they are administrative in character and establish the courts 
as a source of authority and accountability; and they are 
legislative in nature.33  
II. A NEW ERA IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
This Part contends that the decoupling process between 
the right to institutional reform and the remedy 
implemented has already begun. Structural reform continues 
to take place, but more seldom under the auspices of a 
structural injunction. A number of scholars have begun the 
  
 30. Id. at 9-10, 24; cf. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1308 (arguing that the “judicial 
process is an effective mechanism for registering and responding to grievances 
generated by the operation of public programs in a regulatory state 
[because][u]nlike an administrative bureaucracy or a legislature, the judiciary 
must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved”). 
 31. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 28. In fact, Fiss explicitly declares that 
the court’s task in these cases “is not to declare who is right or who is wrong.” Id. 
at 27. 
 32. Id. at 28. 
 33. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1267-68. Horowitz also argues that structural 
injunctions are also resistant to appellate review but this characterization may 
not hold as strongly these days. Id. at 1268. Chayes has also described the 
structural injunction as one that  
seeks to adjust future behavior, not to compensate for past wrong. It is 
deliberately fashioned rather than logically deduced from the nature of 
the legal harm suffered. It provides for a complex, on-going regime of 
performance rather than a simple, one-shot, one-way transfer. Finally, it 
prolongs and deepens, rather than terminates, the court’s involvement 
with the dispute. 
Chayes, supra note 2, at 1298; see also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 637-41 
(describing typical institutional suit and remedial decrees). 
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process of identifying how and why this change is occurring, 
but the conversation can be further enriched so that 
reformers may better understand how to harness these 
changes to achieve their goals. 
A. The Decline of the Traditional Model 
Not everyone was enamored with the structural 
injunction model, which came under fierce criticism for 
showing “minimal regard for the limits of the federal courts’ 
inherent powers.”34 Others have noted a number of the 
disadvantages associated with structural injunctions, such 
as the drain on court resources to formulate and implement, 
the political capital such injunctions often require courts to 
expend, and the degree of intrusion they require on the 
workings of institutions courts may not readily understand.35  
Sometimes, as with Brown, a paradigm shift is easy to 
identify even without the benefit of hindsight. More often, it 
is difficult to say when exactly a shift is about to begin, 
whether one has begun, or when precisely it began.36 The 
empirical question of whether the absolute number of 
structural injunctions issued has declined over the last 
several decades remains largely unanswered,37 but the 
  
 34. Yoo, supra note 13, at 1122; see also Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra 
note 6, at 1090 (“Structural injunctions are accused of . . . excessively 
concentrating power in the court at the expense of the electoral branches.”). 
 35. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 8-12; Fiss, 
Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1148; Laura E. Little, It’s About Time: Unravelling 
Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 933, 950-51 (1993); Meltzer, 
supra note 18, at 320-21; Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law 
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1379 (1991); Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued 
Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LITIG. 99, 107 (2007); Yoo, supra note 13, 
at 1123 & nn.15-17. 
 36. In fact, Fiss, writing in 1979, had reason to believe the structural 
injunction was already at risk as a model of litigation. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra 
note 2, at 4-5 (describing the “counterassault” against the structural injunction 
by the Burger Court). 
 37. Schlanger’s examination of prison litigation reform is a noteworthy 
exception. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of 
Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 553-54 (2006) [hereinafter 
Schlanger, Civil Rights]. 
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academic commentary is largely in agreement that there has 
been a decline.38  
To be sure, some scholars have argued that the purported 
decline has been exaggerated or does not actually exist. Even 
as they document the rise of experimentalism, for example, 
Sabel and Simon discuss the “protean persistence of public 
law litigation.”39 Schlanger contends that in the context of jail 
and prison litigation, at least, there is plenty of on-going 
structural reform, and speculates “that the situation is 
similar in other types of civil rights injunctive litigation, as 
well.”40 Myriam Gilles suggests that this type of court activity 
is actually alive and well because it has been co-opted by the 
conservative movement as, for example, in the higher 
education affirmative action cases.41 Ross Sandler and David 
Schoenbrod argue that the landscape of federal statutory 
regulation has provided judges with new and ever-increasing 
means of entering decrees against state and local officials.42 
This Article’s position is that although the structural 
injunction is far from dead (and will likely be with us for some 
time) it has lost its status as most favored remedy for 
structural reform.  
First, on the doctrinal front, the Court has acted 
repeatedly to limit the scope and availability of these 
injunctions. Judith Resnik has persuasively argued that “the 
majority is developing a new theory of limitations on the 
  
 38. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 14, at 161; Richard L. Marcus, Public Law 
Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 647, 648, 670 (1988); 
Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 295 (1989) (noting that institutional reform litigation has 
decreased in the late twentieth century); Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693, 1696-1705 (2004).  
 39. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1021. 
 40. Schlanger, Civil Rights, supra note 37, at 553-54; see also David Zaring, 
National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional 
Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1020-21 (2004). 
 41. Gilles, supra note 14, at 169-70; see also Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, 
Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest Law, 7 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 483, 493-502 (1984); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 
Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 42. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 11. 
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equitable powers of the federal courts.”43 This set of 
limitations—such as those requiring abstention on the part 
of federal courts under certain conditions, or those governing 
standing for injunctive relief—serves to make wholly 
unavailable entire categories of relief for entire categories of 
plaintiffs.44 Although some of these restrictions can be 
circumvented, such as by filing in state rather than federal 
court, they serve as the new doctrinal baseline with which 
litigants and the lower courts must work. While issuing these 
limitations, the Court has also made clear its declining 
interest in lower court micro-management of complex 
institutions.45 It has repeatedly warned lower courts not to 
overstep the lines of judicial and federal propriety, framing 
its admonitions in terms of both separation of powers and 
federalism concerns.46 
  
 43. Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, 
and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 231 (2003). Resnik contends that “the 
majority has rejected conceptions of a ‘cooperative partnership’ between judges 
and Congress, sharing in the undertaking of lawmaking,” but notes that the door 
may still be open when the court is exercising its equitable powers in furtherance 
of the public interest, as opposed to private interests. Id. at 241, 249-52; see also, 
e.g., David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and 
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1235-36 (“[W]hile the Court has 
not heeded calls to eliminate the structural injunction, it has imposed procedural 
hurdles that substantially erode the availability of the equitable remedy.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 44. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983) (imposing 
standing requirements for injunctive relief); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73 
(1976) (same); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (creating the Younger 
abstention doctrine). 
 45. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351-52 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (warning lower courts against becoming “enmeshed in 
the minutiae of prison operations”). 
 46. See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004) (noting 
that once a consent decree has been satisfied, responsibility must be returned to 
the state and that state officials “must be presumed to have a high degree of 
competence in deciding how best to discharge their governmental 
responsibilities”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (striking down an 
injunction as being “inordinately—indeed, wildly—intrusive” and noting that the 
process by which it was developed “failed to give adequate consideration to the 
views of state prison authorities”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) 
(“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking . . . peculiarly within 
the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. . . . 
[S]eparation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”). 
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The second aspect of the decline is harder to quantify and 
attribute: more of a shift in the cultural Weltanschauung 
than anything else, a decline in motivating philosophy as 
opposed to empirical practice. Fiss describes it in relation to 
Brown, which by the mid-1970s had begun “to lose its 
axiomatic power.”47 Some of the factors he identifies include 
the retirement of the justices originally responsible for 
Brown, a societal movement away from the integrative ideals 
of Brown, and “a fuller appreciation of the difficulties of 
administrative injunctions.”48 As Gilles aptly puts it, there is 
“a sort of sub-constitutional, extra-legal discomfort with the 
role of judges in institutional reform litigation.”49 The 
doctrinal developments in the case law are an inevitable 
result of this culture shift, much of which is itself rooted in 
separation of powers concerns.50 And legislatures themselves 
have internalized and appropriated these arguments, using 
them to justify inaction in the face of judicial orders.51 As one 
lawmaker from Kansas recently stated, “I think the bottom 
line is that you still have a constitutional issue here as to 
which branch has the power of the purse. . . . And clearly that 
duty lies with the legislative branch. I don’t believe that’s the 
place of the court.”52 
  
 47. Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1149-50; cf. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 33 (“The battle to overthrow segregation is not the 
right model for all interrelationships between federal and state and local 
officials.”). Brown arguably no longer means what it once meant substantively 
either. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 41, at 3-5. 
 48. Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1149-50; cf. Horowitz, supra note 21, 
at 1288 (“The use of litigation to effect change in large, complex, ongoing, public 
institutions is a more hazardous venture than it is frequently made out to be.”). 
 49. Gilles, supra note 14, at 146. 
 50. See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 562 (noting that “under the Constitution, the first 
question to be answered is not whose plan is best, but in what branch of the 
Government is lodged the authority to initially devise the plan”); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 179-81 (providing a fuller discussion of these concerns). 
 51. See, e.g., Trevor Graff & John Eligon, Court Orders Kansas Legislature to 
Spend More on Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/08/us/kansas-school-spending-ruling.html?_r=0 (reporting that the Kansas 
state legislature has been withholding constitutionally mandated school 
payments in defiance of a court order). 
 52. Id. 
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Quantifying the decline, to the extent it exists, is 
ultimately irrelevant and unnecessary. It is sufficient to note 
the existing dissatisfaction with the structural injunction as 
the default means of procuring institutional reform. In many 
ways, the structural injunction is no more than a straw man, 
and has been nothing more for some time: the frequency with 
which these cases are resolved via settlement between the 
parties as opposed to trial has by now so often been stated as 
to be uninteresting.53 If the desired end result is a negotiated 
consent decree or other form of settlement agreement, and 
the means of getting there (i.e., the relief requested) is what 
detractors find offensive and arguably unnecessary for 
procuring the desired end result, litigators can and should 
reevaluate the relief requested.  
Although this Article takes no normative stance as to the 
death of the structural injunction, it urges litigators to begin 
the process of estate planning. If the right to institutional 
reform persists, can we identify a remedy worthy of the task 
and similarly capable of providing systemic relief? 
B. New Governance, Experimentalism & Multilateralism  
Gerald Rosenberg has famously described the idea that 
litigation alone can produce systemic change as a “hollow 
hope,”54 and Stuart Scheingold has similarly decried “[t]he 
myth of rights,” by which court articulation of a right is 
sufficient to produce reform.55 More recent scholarship has 
focused on what has arisen to take the place of traditional 
litigation. This scholarship—along with the phenomenon it 
explores—is often categorized as “new governance”: a shift 
away from rights-claiming litigation-focused strategies 
towards more experimental, multilateral, and flexible means 
of reform.56  
  
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 72-80. 
 54. ROSENBERG, supra note 8. 
 55. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 5 (2d ed. 2004). 
 56. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and 
in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 471, 472-74 (2004); Lobel, supra note 3, at 345-50; Douglas NeJaime, When 
New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 324-26 (2009). 
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This Article will focus on those aspects of new governance 
most relevant to institutional reform and add the following: 
first, what we are seeing in the courts portends a wholesale 
paradigm shift in the way public interest litigation will be 
conducted in years to come, whether reformers like it or not; 
second, much of this shift is hostile to structural reform, and; 
third, there is still time for reformers to adapt the new 
constraints to their advantage to continue to pursue 
institutional change. 
Some scholars contend that the decline of the structural 
injunction is nothing to mourn because more democratic 
solutions to the rights problem have evolved to take its place, 
in the form of experimentalist problem-solving courts.57 In a 
series of articles beginning in the late 1990s, Michael Dorf, 
Charles Sabel, and William Simon make a compelling case 
that top-down institutional reform has gradually and 
increasingly been replaced by a more localized “democratic 
experimentalism.”58 They identify a “Scylla of deference” and 
a “Charybdis of usurpation,”59 and urge the legal system to 
embrace this experimentalism as a means of addressing 
broad social problems without having to resort to “judicial 
exhortation and intimidation.”60  
These scholars, who might properly be referred to as 
“experimentalists,” offer many of the traditional critiques of 
the structural injunction. They argue that the institutions 
subject to traditional institutional reform have their own 
internal mechanisms for accountability that the courts have 
  
 57. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1019-20. But see, 
e.g., Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 
1142-43 (2006) (critiquing the decline of formal adjudication via delegation and 
privatization and noting that access to quality adjudication is increasingly class 
based). 
 58. Dorf, supra note 3, at 884; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3; Sabel & Simon, 
Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1019-20. 
 59. Dorf, supra note 3, at 882; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 393 (“[T]he 
Court in practice faces a familiar Hobson’s choice. It can defer to political 
decisions however arrived at, knowing that deference invites caprice and 
manipulation by the lawmaker. Or it can scrutinize the decision in the light of its 
balancing techniques. But this scrutiny threatens to paralyze or disqualify 
democracy.”). 
 60. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 395.  
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disregarded without legitimacy or expertise.61 They prefer 
instead the work of experimentalist courts, sometimes 
referred to as problem-solving courts, which substitute 
participatory administration for comprehensive top-down 
reform.62 They praise the increased flexibility of these courts 
and the collaboration and stakeholder participation they 
enable.63 Although some experimentalist courts operate at 
the trial court level, as with the newly popular drug courts, 
others continue to issue injunctions, but focus more on 
outputs rather than inputs.64 These new injunctions are 
praised for being less intrusive, more flexible, and more 
process oriented than those of old.65  
In addition to experimentalism, there have been both 
normative and descriptive developments on the multilateral 
(as opposed to unilateral judge-centered) nature of structural 
reform in both the courts and the academic commentary. The 
courts have begun to press for increased involvement from 
stakeholders.66 And, in contrast to the unilateral model 
propagated by Fiss, commentators have both begun to 
acknowledge that non-judicial players have always had a role 
to play and to urge their increased involvement.  
Margo Schlanger, for example, details the many non-
judicial players driving reform, such as plaintiffs’ counsel and 
public interest lawyers, arguing persuasively that 
“[i]nstitutional reform litigation is not a judicial movement 
  
 61. E.g., Dorf, supra note 3, at 942. 
 62. E.g., id. at 886. 
 63. E.g., Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1020. 
 64. Id. at 1019 (describing cases in which courts focus on providing the parties 
with “governing norms . . . that express the goals the parties are expected to 
achieve . . . leav[ing] the parties with a substantial range of discretion as to how 
to achieve these goals”) (emphasis omitted). 
 65. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 
95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1411-12 (2007) (describing “[n]ewer decrees [that] typically 
avoid the ‘kitchen sink’ approach to institutional reform in favor of orders that 
identify goals the defendants are expected to achieve and specify standards and 
procedures for measurement of performance”). 
 66. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (holding that nonparties 
affected by consent decrees may collaterally attack the decrees if they were not 
joined to the litigation). 
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but a political practice.”67 She is representative of a group of 
scholars, whom some have denominated “multilateralists,”68 
who recognize that the polycentricity of the paradigmatic 
case for structural reform is resolved polycentrically, with a 
number of stakeholders participating and a focus on a 
negotiated result.69 Experimentalists have also noted the 
multilateral nature of even the traditional model of 
structural reform.70 And others have argued that judges are 
relatively passive even in traditional structural reform cases, 
anointing instead a “controlling group—a bureaucracy 
consisting of attorneys for the parties, the functionaries and 
experts they bring into the negotiating room, and various 
court-appointed officials such as special masters.”71 
C.  Other Aspects of the New Era 
The emerging era of reform has several other defining 
characteristics.72 First and foremost, the new reform does not 
proceed with the single-minded goal of procuring a structural 
  
 67. Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 3, at 2036; cf. Judith Resnik, 
For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of 
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 176 (2003) (describing federal judges as 
“no longer heroic solo actors but part of a corporate body that has begun to 
socialize the next generation of judges to be suspicious of adjudication and to 
prefer negotiation”). 
 68. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 40, at 1028 (“Multilateralists conceptualize 
institutional reform lawsuits as independent, ad hoc committees convened in a 
courtroom and composed of stakeholders in a government institution—the 
officials who run it, the people most affected by it, and their lawyers and 
experts.”). 
 69. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 7; Marc 
Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984) (coining the term “litigotiation”); Susan P. Sturm, 
The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981, 995-97 (1993) (discussing the 
importance of stakeholder participation and the participation values implicated 
by structural reform); Zaring, supra note 40, at 1062-72 (identifying various 
repeat players). 
 70. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 401 (noting that in the context of 
institutional reform litigation “[e]ven traditional courts often directly involve the 
parties in the formulation of remedial decrees”). 
 71. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 118-19. 
 72. See id. at 117-38.  
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injunction, but rather with the intention of producing 
negotiated change, most often via pre-trial settlement.73 If 
the defendants refuse to settle and a structural injunction is 
issued, so be it and all the better, but the injunction is not the 
be all and end all of litigation. The drive for injunctive relief 
no longer shapes the litigation, which is brought to provide 
the leverage needed to get defendants to the bargaining 
table.74 The goal of litigation is not an injunction, per se, but 
relief, typically procured in the form of negotiated change. 
This Article contends that the conflation of the these two 
conceptually separate pieces—the change sought, on the one 
hand, and the injunction used as a means of getting there, on 
the other—is unnecessary and should be reexamined. 
Negotiated change may be procured through means other 
than a request for an injunction and, where those means 
would be more cost-effective and efficient, litigators should 
consider utilizing them. 
Michael Dorf has written that “[e]ven the most 
enthusiastic defenders of structural reform litigation 
recognize that courts are at best ‘sub-optimal decision 
makers’ in these contexts.”75 Dorf’s observation is precisely 
right. Reformers continue to file these cases not so much 
because they hope for court-ordered relief as because they see 
the litigation as necessary for destabilization.76 Litigators 
seeking structural injunctions are fully cognizant of the 
normative and practical difficulties engendered by 
injunctions, but they do so regardless because the suits are 
designed to drive negotiation. The mistake critics of the 
structural injunction make is to think that the only 
  
 73. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 69, at 268 (referring to “the strategic pursuit 
of a settlement through mobilizing the court process”); Judith Resnik, Litigating 
and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 835, 840 (1997) [hereinafter Resnik, Litigating and Settling] (“The shared 
understanding is that commencing a lawsuit is a plan to litigate or to settle a case 
but is rarely a plan to try a case.”). 
 74. Cf. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 55, at 148 (“The politics of rights . . . involves 
the manipulation of rights rather than their realization. Rights are treated as 
contingent resources which impact on public policy indirectly—in the measure, 
that is, that they can aid in altering the balance of political forces.”). 
 75. Dorf, supra note 3, at 941-42.  
 76. See Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1020. 
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judicially-driven successes are those in which the court 
actually issues a structural injunction. It is the request for 
the injunction—and perhaps even more importantly, the 
evidence of wrong-doing exposed by the pre-filing and 
discovery process—that drives defendants to the bargaining 
table and that is the outcome by which success is and should 
be measured.  
This shift in reform strategy is part and parcel of the 
settlement dynamic that pervades all of modern litigation, 
both civil and criminal. In most cases, the court is never even 
given the opportunity to issue the injunction.77 In addition to 
the usual suspects driving settlement, there are a number of 
other additional factors in this context. Schlanger, for 
example, notes that “defendants who agree to a decree may 
transform themselves in the eyes of the public, and even in 
their own eyes, from ‘lawbreakers to law implementers.’”78 
She also theorizes that the parties may believe true 
institutional change more likely to result from a negotiated 
settlement rather than a judicially imposed order, and that 
defendants cooperate because they know settlement will 
result in increased resources for their institution.79 Others 
have noted that defendants may settle to avoid even more 
burdensome court-imposed rules.80 
  
 77. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: 
Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 928-29 (2000) 
(noting that roughly 60 to 70% of civil cases settle and exploring how federal 
judges came to understand their role as including the management and 
settlement of cases); see also Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: 
What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly 
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 27-28 (1983) (putting the 
number at closer to 90%). 
 78. Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 3, at 2012. 
 79. Id.; see also Zaring, supra note 40, at 1046 (“Because it is difficult to resort 
to another court for relitigation of a remedial determination, and because, when 
appeal is possible, those determinations are reviewed deferentially, institutional 
reform litigants face powerful incentives to agree on a remedy rather than waiting 
for the district court to impose one.”). 
 80. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 122, 167-71; Frank 
M. Coffin, The Frontier of Remedies: A Call for Exploration, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 
994 (1979). 
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Second, just as the structural injunction is no longer the 
centerpiece of litigation, litigation itself is no longer the 
centerpiece of reform efforts.81 It is now standard practice to 
treat litigation as but one of several inter-related activities, 
all designed to produce institutional change.82 Litigation is 
now coordinated with a host of extra-judicial activities—such 
as lobbying, public education, and grassroots organizing—
explicitly intended to mutually reinforce and amplify one 
another.83 
Organizations like the ACLU increasingly file a lawsuit 
but then also publish related reports, profile individuals 
similarly situated to their named plaintiffs (or the named 
plaintiffs themselves), partner with other like-minded but 
non-litigating organizations, and hire lobbyists to work on 
the same issues addressed by the lawsuit. The litigation itself 
is but a pressure point, designed to bring political actors into 
compliance, lest the litigators procure less palatable court-
ordered relief.84 This way of doing business is reflected in 
foundation funding practices, which now pay for items like 
public messaging workshops for advocates and multi-
pronged campaigns that include litigation as just one part of 
many.85 
Third, although structural reform has often been driven 
primarily by an elite group of repeat players (like the ACLU), 
  
 81. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2028 (2008) (surveying public interest lawyers and noting 
that “the organizational leaders . . . have been acutely aware of the limits of 
litigation in securing social change”). 
 82. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 150-51; 
Rhode, supra note 81, at 2046-48. 
 83. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 151; 
Rhode, supra note 81, at 2028. 
 84. It is nevertheless a much-needed pressure point. See, e.g., Rhode, supra 
note 81, at 2044 (noting that “[c]ourts may not always be the most effective 
dispute resolution forums, but they are often the most accessible; they are open 
as of right and can force more economically or politically powerful parties to the 
bargaining table”). 
 85. The Michigan Campaign for Justice, for example, is a 501(c)(4) coalition 
funded by Atlantic Philanthropies. About Us, MICHIGAN CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE, 
http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/about_us.php (last visited May 6, 
2014). 
570 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63  
those players increasingly work from the same playbook and 
in cooperation with major law firms.86 Each of these facets is 
arguably causally related to the others and together they 
result in an increasingly unwieldy model case structure. 
David Zaring has identified what he calls “transjudicial 
administration,” wherein law spreads horizontally between 
trial courts.87 Zaring argues that information is “exchanged 
by repeat players who participate in multiple cases, most 
commonly as counsel or expert witnesses.”88 In the context of 
structural reform, repeat players now include big firms, 
which routinely cooperate with non-profit organizations to 
bring large class action lawsuits, lending their expertise and 
resources in exchange for prestige and hands on experience 
for their junior associates.89 
These typically defense-side firms have in turn brought 
their standard practices to their pro bono work and, indeed, 
pride themselves on treating their pro bono cases in the same 
way as their paying cases. Schlanger describes this dynamic 
in the context of prison litigation, but it holds true in the 
broader civil rights context as well. She contends that the 
personnel shift towards the private bar has “fed [an] arms 
race, as large-firm attorneys have followed their ordinary 
large-firm ‘playbook’ to make the cases even more expensive, 
more thoroughly litigated, and more complex.”90 Schlanger 
observes the self-reinforcing nature of this change: “If it takes 
Wilson Sonsini’s resources to litigate a prison case 
  
 86. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 81, at 2070 (reporting that four fifths of public 
interest organizations reported extensive or moderate collaboration with the 
private bar); cf. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 124 
(noting that in typical structural reform litigation, “the plaintiff, usually a large 
class of people, is unable to control the attorney”); Resnik, Litigating and Settling, 
supra note 73, at 860 (“Everyone is an interested actor in this story—litigants, 
lawyers, guardians ad litem, special masters, court-appointed experts, testifying 
witnesses, litigant activist groups, objectors, judges. . . . [M]any are repeat 
players, whose incentives are framed by events beyond the case at hand.”). 
 87. Zaring, supra note 40, at 1016-17. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Rhode, supra note 81, at 2070-73. 
 90. Schlanger, Civil Rights, supra note 37, at 616; cf. Rhode, supra note 81, at 
2035-36 (describing the increasing complexity of civil rights litigation). 
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successfully, there is ever more reason for inmate advocacy 
groups to find law firms to take cases on.”91  
It is only natural for repeat players to share stories, to 
coordinate, and to model future cases upon past successes. 
This tendency, combined with the involvement of large firms, 
has resulted in an increasingly cumbersome form of public 
interest litigation, wherein months and sometimes years of 
pre-filing research culminates in a lengthy complaint seeking 
every type of relief possible. The standard law firm model of 
litigation is a belt and suspenders model, in which one cannot 
conceive of not requesting a type of relief that might be 
granted, i.e., in which the pleadings will inevitably contain a 
request for both declaratory and injunctive relief.92  
Structural reformers have had great success with this 
model, partnering with the same group of law firms 
repeatedly, and filing the same types of cases. The difficulty 
with this expansive and expensive model of litigation—
however thorough, admirable, and successful—is that it has 
undoubtedly contributed to the decline in structural reform. 
As the cases have increased in size and complexity, it can 
become daunting even to conceive of filing one: those with the 
resources to file can often manage only one such case at a 
time, and those seeking pro bono counsel find potential 
partners wary of taking on such a large commitment, 
particularly in tougher economic times.  
III. AN OLD REMEDY FOR A NEW ERA 
We should breathe new life into the declaratory 
judgment. It is uniquely suited to filling the gaps in 
structural reform left by the decline of the injunction and the 
rise of experimentalism, and at the same time responsive to 
the same anxieties that have created and shaped these gaps. 
Every age has its neuroses and the declaratory judgment 
seems almost specially tailored for ours, capable of providing 
market-driven reform as opposed to court-ordered regulated 
remedies. It is, moreover, also a powerful litigation tool that 
  
 91. Schlanger, Civil Rights, supra, note 37, at 620-21. 
 92. For a discussion of how this dynamic has played out in the indigent defense 
reform context, see infra text accompanying notes 171-75. 
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has to date been overlooked, capable of streamlining 
litigation and reducing resource consumption while at the 
same time providing much-needed institutional reform.93 
A. Reconsidering & Repurposing the Declaratory Judgment 
Civil rights reformers typically request declaratory relief 
only in addition to injunctive relief, and courts in turn 
typically issue declarations only in conjunction with 
injunctions. The “better safe than sorry” approach makes a 
certain amount of sense from a litigator’s perspective;94 the 
Declaratory Judgments Act explicitly permits the issuance of 
a declaration “whether or not further relief is or could be 
sought;”95 and early advocates of declaratory relief, like 
Professor Edwin Borchard, advocated this type of pleading as 
well.96 This Article urges reformers to rethink this strategy 
because it squanders the unique advantages of declaratory 
relief. Contrary to the popular belief that a plaintiff has 
“much to gain and nothing to lose by asking [for a 
declaration],” more is not always better.97  
The classic use of the declaratory judgment is to provide 
relief where a potential wrong has not yet occurred (and 
therefore injunctive relief is not available).98 The harm 
addressed is the uncertainty associated with not knowing 
  
 93. As Fiss puts it in his casebook on injunctions, “[t]he declaratory judgment 
has failed to achieve its potential.” OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, 
INJUNCTIONS 172 (2d ed. 1984). 
 94. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 
1322 (2010) [hereinafter Bray, Preventive Adjudication] (noting the “superfluous 
use of the declaratory judgment is now common practice”). 
 95. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
 96. Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural 
Reform II, 28 YALE L.J. 105, 105-06 (1918). 
 97. Id. at 106. 
 98. As Borchard puts it, “[t]he court, in effect, by refusing an injunction informs 
the prospective victim that the only way to determine whether the suspect is a 
mushroom or a toadstool, is to eat it.” Declaratory Judgments: Hearings on H.R. 
5623 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong. 75-76 
(1928); see also Edwin M. Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 793 passim (1932). 
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whether an injury would occur,99 and they provide what 
Samuel Bray calls preventive adjudication: adjudication that 
seeks an opinion not accompanied by a remedial order, that 
is prospective in nature, and that applies the law to a 
particular set of facts.100 It has typically been sought on its 
own, independent of a request for an injunction, only to 
resolve discrete problems, such as patent infringement or an 
action to quiet title. When requested in the context of 
structural reform, it is typically an afterthought: an 
addendum to the real prize of a structural injunction. 
This Article focuses on using the declaratory judgment 
where injunctive relief is available, either because the wrong 
is imminent or on-going, but nevertheless not preferable, 
because it is not the most efficient or effective means of 
pursuing relief.101 It advocates the use of the declaratory 
judgment to serve the purpose that traditional injunctive 
relief does, to address on-going and/or imminent harm, and 
to achieve structural reform.102 
  
 99. One of the main advantages of the declaratory judgment is its use for those 
who wish to establish the legality (or illegality) of conduct in which they would 
like to engage. This scenario typically arises where the plaintiff seeks a 
declaration in federal court that a state statute under which prosecution is 
anticipated is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). 
 100. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1277-78. 
 101. This way of using the declaratory judgment is akin to the type of offensive 
deterrent remedy described by Daniel Meltzer, who notes the importance of such 
remedies when confronted by the “distinctive problems of preventing misconduct 
by public officials in an era of large government institutions.” Meltzer, supra note 
18, at 278. 
 102. Cf. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1279-80 (describing 
remedial adjudication as involving “an injury that has already happened (or will 
happen imminently)”). Bray is concerned about the use of preventive adjudication 
before the harm becomes imminent (at which point injunctive relief is available). 
Id. at 1285-86. This Article contemplates its use after the harm has already 
commenced, but is on-going. There is thus no concern that the declaratory 
judgment is an advisory opinion, the issuance of which is flatly prohibited by the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, which requires that an “actual controversy” exist. 28 
U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 
239-42 (1937) (noting that the Act requires a substantial controversy, between 
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment). 
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Declarations remain distinct from injunctions even 
where both may be available. As Fiss puts it,  
[t]he injunction consists of a declaration of rights and duties backed 
by threat of sanction. It gives the defendant one more chance. The 
declaratory judgment, on the other hand, gives the defendant two 
more chances: it consists of a declaration of rights and duties, and 
if the defendant disobeys the plaintiff cannot get a contempt order, 
but only an injunction to prevent another act of disobedience.103 
Declarations are similar in temperament to what Fiss 
has called the “preventive injunction,” or an injunction that 
orders the defendant to stop doing a particular thing (e.g., 
“stop discriminating”).104 They are also at least theoretically 
easier to procure than an injunction, as there is no need to 
demonstrate a lack of an adequate remedy at law or 
irreparable harm.105 
Although some of the types of wrong-doing may be 
amenable to a preventive injunction (e.g., stop searching 
students without reasonable suspicion) others are much less 
easily so addressed (e.g., end mass incarceration). More 
complex problems require more complex remedies, but they 
do not necessarily require more complex requests for relief. 
Reformers, courts, and scholars have largely assumed that 
complex remedies must be delivered via a request for a 
structural injunction (that then typically results in a 
settlement agreement) that regulates the various systemic 
inputs and/or outputs to obtain the desired result.106  
This Article contends that similar results can be obtained 
with purely declaratory relief. It may be sufficient, in other 
words, for the court merely to declare that the current 
situation is unconstitutional to prompt the negotiation over 
reform. The remainder of this Article will lay out the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of pursuing solely declaratory 
relief and then explore what this relief might look like in each 
  
 103. Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1122; see also FISS & RENDLEMAN, 
supra note 93, at 174 (noting that injunctions “add contempt’s bite to the 
declaration’s bark”). 
 104. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7-8 (1978) [hereinafter FISS, 
CIVIL RIGHTS].  
 105. See infra text accompanying notes 139-41. 
 106. See Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1019-20. 
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of the major life stages of a reform action. As in real life, 
success will largely be measured by the extent to which 
defendants are persuaded to negotiate change; just as the 
request for an injunction can be decoupled from the 
negotiated reform, so too can the request for a declaration.  
B.  A Strong Separationist Approach  
Declaratory judging is eminently suited to producing 
structural reform in a way that even the most ardent 
proponents of judicial minimalism and separation of powers 
should feel comfortable with.107 This Article will refer to these 
positions generally as “separationist” in nature. There are 
two strands to the separationist philosophy, one weak and 
the other strong. The weak version argues that decisions 
about restructuring institutions will eventually be made by 
the political branches regardless of the type of litigation relief 
sought or granted. The strong version argues that there are 
a variety of institutional and structural reasons why the 
political branches should be making these decisions instead 
of the courts. This Section will focus upon the merits of 
declaratory relief relative to the strong version. 
Separationists argue in favor of judicial restraint for a 
variety of reasons. First, there are those who believe that 
judicial minimalism promotes democracy. Cass Sunstein, for 
example, urges “breathing space” for the political process and 
argues that judicially mandated reform is simply less 
democratic than reform that arises from the political 
branches.108 In this telling, judicial minimalism is both 
“democracy-forcing” and related to legitimacy.109 The less 
  
 107. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (arguing that “the inquiry 
of federal courts into prison management must be limited to the issue of whether 
a particular system violates any prohibition of the Constitution or, in the case of 
a federal prison, a statute”). 
 108. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 19-20; see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 45-46 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REASONING]; cf. Dorf, supra note 3, at 892 (describing “[t]he often praised but 
rarely practiced philosophy of judicial restraint [as] a relatively close cousin of 
radical democracy”). 
 109. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 7; cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 
1, 10 (1973) (“It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of 
governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the 
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judges do, the more the political branches are empowered to 
do, creating space for the democratic process, which is both 
more inclusive and produces a better outcome.110 One might 
also contend that the increased transparency afforded by the 
political process (as opposed to injunctions and consent 
decrees) is beneficial to democracy as well.111 
Second, many have identified the gap created by 
structural injunctions between what is constitutionally 
required to protect rights and what courts actually order 
defendants to do, noting that this problem increases with the 
specificity of the injunctive language.112 It is often difficult to 
firmly ground the individual provisions of structural 
  
political branches directly responsible—as the Judicial Branch is not—to the 
electoral process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental 
activity in which the courts have less competence.”).  
 110. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 19; see also SANDLER & 
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 172 (“The annals of democracy by 
decree are full of cases in which defendants consented to a decree in order to avoid 
responsibility for politically difficult choices or to evade constitutional 
requirements for legislative action.”); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and 
the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 (1978) (“The 
substitution of government by the federal judiciary for local self-government 
involves dangerous disproportionality; it sacrifices fundamental democratic 
values in order to vindicate particular constitutional rights.”). 
 111. Cf. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 199-200, 216-
19 (proposing to increase the transparency and formality of consent decrees); 
Margo Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why and How We Should End the 
Practical Obscurity of Injunctions and Consent Decrees, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 515, 
515 (2010) [hereinafter Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation] (noting that 
“notwithstanding the individual and collective importance of . . . injunctions, they 
languish in practical obscurity, unavailable to all but the extraordinarily 
persevering researcher who joins inside information with abundant funds”).  
 112. Nagel, supra note 110, at 708-10; see also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 102 (arguing that judges have used structural 
reform to pursue “aspirational goals” rather than enforce rights); Fletcher, supra 
note 16, at 652-54 (noting the “distorting effect of the court’s power to order an 
affirmative remedy in the absence of an agreement among the parties” on 
settlement negotiations); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 955-58 (1978); cf. Meltzer, supra note 18, at 249 
(identifying “deterrent remedies” as “those in which the litigant obtains more 
than he is entitled to, when measured against the harm to his rights that he has 
suffered or is likely to suffer in the future”). 
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injunctions in concrete constitutional requirements.113 
Separationists delight in pointing out, for example, the court 
orders requiring that the temperature in a prison not exceed 
a certain temperature or that inmates be allotted a minimum 
particular square footage.114 
Third, separationists typically contend that judges are 
less competent than the political branches to enact 
institutional reform. This criticism heightens when the 
injunction sought will inevitably be costly to implement and 
enforce. Separationists contend that these problems are 
polycentric because court-required expenditures may impact 
other programs and institutions not before the court and/or 
require tax increases.115 The idea is that courts are ill-
equipped to consider these external impacts and their 
institutional competency suffers in relation to that of the 
political branches accordingly.116 This argument is related to 
the criticism that court cases almost always fail to consult all 
the impacted or relevant parties, some of whom may surface 
after the litigation has concluded and an injunction 
implemented.117 Relatedly, others have argued that at least 
  
 113. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (“Courts must be mindful that 
these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers 
to them must reflect that fact rather than a court’s idea of how best to operate a 
detention facility.”). 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 541-43; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 711-14 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 96-97 (1976). Fiss’s response is that although the 
Constitution does not say anything about the temperatures of showers, “it does 
say something about equality and humane treatment, and a court trying to give 
meaning to those values may find it both necessary and appropriate—as a way of 
bringing the organization within the bounds of the Constitution—to issue 
directives on these matters.” Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 50. 
 115. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 21, at 591 (contrasting a “Rights Maximizing” 
approach with an “Interest Balancing” approach); Horowitz, supra note 21, at 
1305 (noting that “[c]ourts operate one case at a time. They never need lay prison 
needs against welfare needs, because they work on the premise that they are 
declaring rights. If a party has a right, it is not bounded by cost.”); Nagel, supra 
note 110, at 710-11 (advocating the minimization of such judicial remedies with 
“third-party consequences”).  
 116. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 16, at 648-49. 
 117. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1291-95 (describing “five assumptions 
typically indulged by the courts—and often incorrectly,” that the plaintiffs are 
homogenous, that the defendant organizations have a coherent structure, “that 
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some of the problems reformers have sought to address via 
structural reform are really resource problems, not rights 
problems, and therefore perhaps not problems for the courts 
at all.118  
Finally, there is arguably a heightened separationist 
concern where a federal court seeks to take over a 
traditionally state run institution, such as a school system or 
state prison.119 
The traditional response to the separationists is to say 
they have missed the whole point of structural reform, which 
is inherently countermajoritarian.120 Given the decline of the 
structural injunction and the increasing sway separationist 
arguments appear to have on courts (and the Court), this 
response is no longer sufficient as a practical matter, 
however theoretically persuasive it may be. The approach 
urged by this Article seeks to address the separationist 
concerns more transparently while at the same time 
providing a practical mechanism for reformers to use to 
achieve the desired level of institutional change.  
Use of declaratory judgments in the way this Article 
advocates is largely an exercise in judicial minimalism, but 
without many of the drawbacks to minimalism that Sunstein 
identifies: it does not threaten rule of law values, it does not 
  
the relevant organizations are before the court,” that the defendant organizations 
have consistent interests, and “that plaintiffs and defendants are on opposite 
sides of the case”); cf. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (holding that 
nonparties affected by consent decrees may collaterally attack the decrees if they 
were not joined to the litigation). 
 118. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1289.  
 119. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112-13 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (noting that factors contributing to school desegregation “are best 
addressed by the representative branches” and citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267 (1977)); Milliken, 433 U.S. at 281 (admonishing federal courts to “take 
into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own 
affairs”).  
 120. See, e.g., FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 60 (arguing that in the 
context of the civil rights injunction, “the nonrepresentative quality of the 
judiciary becomes a virtue rather than a vice. Constitutional rights are supposed 
to be countermajoritarian . . . .”); see also Chayes, supra note 2, at 1307-11 
(identifying other responses to the separationist argument); Fiss, 1978 Term, 
supra note 2, at 15, 32-35 (same). 
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produce unfairness through dissimilar treatment of the 
similarly situated, and there is no indication that the types 
of issues relevant to this discussion are those that are “ill 
suited to democratic choice, either because [they] should be 
off-limits to politics or because democratic deliberation is not 
functioning well”—to the extent the latter is true, the point 
of the declaration is to prompt the efficacious use of 
democratic deliberation to arrive at a solution to a problem 
some stakeholders were perhaps resistant to recognizing.121  
There is a strong argument in favor of judicial 
minimalism in cases of moral uncertainty.122 This Article 
contends that minimalism is actually also (or even more) 
called for not just in these hard cases, but in the big ones as 
well, in which the declaration of rights is not particularly 
difficult (or morally uncertain) and part of the issue is not 
rapidly changing circumstances but circumstances that have 
stayed the same for too long.123  
Finally, with regard to the federalist flavor of the 
separationist concern, a declaratory judgment will often be 
less intrusive on state sovereignty than an injunction, 
offering the federal court confronted with a request to 
overhaul a state institution a remedy that respects comity 
but reserves authority.124 Declarations may be drafted 
broadly and injunctions may be drafted narrowly, but the use 
of the declaration as advocated by this Article—to prod the 
responsible political entities to reform—should generally 
speaking, be less objectionable from a states’ rights 
  
 121. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 29. 
 122. Cf. id. at 30. 
 123. Cf. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1284 (noting that 
“[a]sking for only declaratory relief when more is available may perhaps be useful 
in public law cases, where courts are sometimes reticent or constrained in giving 
monetary or injunctive relief”). 
 124. Where abstention doctrine applies to injunctive relief, it will also apply to 
declaratory relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 & n.2 (1971); Samuels v. 
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971); see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 
922, 931 (1975) (“At the conclusion of a successful federal challenge to a state 
statute or local ordinance, a district court can generally protect the interests of a 
federal plaintiff by entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger 
injunctive medicine will be unnecessary.”). 
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perspective.125 A less coercive sanction may also be easier to 
swallow, particularly when it is one that provides flexibility 
and requires stakeholder participation in crafting a 
solution.126 And, of course, there is no change from the status 
quo where a negotiated settlement results. 
C. Efficiency, Efficiency, Efficiency: A Weak Separationist 
Approach 
The real role of litigation in the new era of public interest 
reform is to prod a negotiated settlement and it is 
unnecessary to seek injunctive relief to do so.127 Seeking such 
relief also contributes to needless inefficiency in the litigation 
process.128 If the eventual result of nearly all institutional 
reform litigation is negotiated settlement, that litigation 
should be structured as efficiently as possible. Furthermore, 
if an injunction is unlikely to result even in the event of a 
successful litigation (because the parties settled) and seeking 
an injunction is likely to complicate and prolong the 
litigation, litigators should seek relief that both avoids those 
complications and can still result either in the very same 
settlement or ultimate institutional change comparable to 
that which would be provided by an injunction. 
The model of declaratory judging described above offers 
three main sources of efficiency and cost savings, not just for 
  
 125. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1141, 1239 (1988) (noting that “an injunction may often be more intrusive on 
traditional state sovereign prerogatives than a declaratory judgment”). 
 126. Cf. Lobel, supra note 3, at 391. 
 127. Some experimentalists have described the process of structural reform as 
one of “destabilization,” in which a previously unaccountable institution is forced 
(or encouraged) to change its ways. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, 
supra note 6, at 1056; see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: 
ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 550 
(Verso 2004) (1987). The idea is that the litigation process “induces the institution 
to reform itself in a process in which it must respond to previously excluded 
stakeholders.” Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1056; see also id. 
at 1020 (“Destabilization rights are claims to unsettle and open up public 
institutions that have chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are 
substantially insulated from the normal processes of political accountability.”). 
 128. See Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1056. 
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would-be reformers, but for defendants and the courts as 
well. Because it does not appear that anyone has actually 
ever filed a case seeking structural reform via solely 
declaratory relief, they are presented below from least to 
most speculative. 
First, the declaratory judging model recognizes, whether 
as a normative or a descriptive matter, that the subject 
matter of institutional reform cases will end up before the 
political branches sooner or later because that is where the 
money is. From a descriptive perspective, the actual work of 
reforming an institution takes place only with the 
participation of the political branches and administrative 
agencies ultimately responsible for procuring funding for the 
institution, implementing new systems and controls, and 
complying with court orders or negotiated agreements.129 The 
declaratory judgment prods those government actors to act 
sooner rather than later, with additional court action 
threatened should their solutions prove unsatisfactory to the 
plaintiff class. 
From a normative separationist perspective, declaratory 
judgments are firmly sited within the core competences of the 
courts in a way that structural injunctions are not. 
Declaratory judgments ask courts to declare actions lawful or 
unlawful, applying well-defined legal standards to a set of 
facts.130 In contrast to the traditional model of the structural 
injunction, which envisions an on-going dialogue between the 
court and the parties, the declaratory relief model envisions 
a dialogue between the parties and the political branches 
(after an introductory statement made by the court).131 
  
 129. Cf. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 55, at 5. 
 130. Cf. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1304 (“The courts have a comparative 
advantage when it comes to adjudicating rights; they have none when it comes to 
enforcing complex remedies.”); Edson R. Sunderland, The Courts as Authorized 
Legal Advisers of the People, 54 AM. L. REV. 161, 171-72 (1920). 
 131. Cf. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1333 (“Preventive 
adjudication may foster democratic values, because by speaking sotto voce a court 
can engage in a dialogue with the legislative or executive branch about remedial 
choices.”); Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1144 (“An administrative decree 
requires a long continuing relationship between the equity court and the parties, 
in which initial directives are modified in light of changed conditions or new 
insights.”). 
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Following a court’s declaration of rights, which serves as the 
baseline below which defendants may not fall, the various 
stakeholders are left to work out the details.132 
The use of strategically escalated court involvement has 
ample support in the precedent. For example, in Hutto v. 
Finney,133 the Court approved the imposition of a maximum 
limit on the number of days inmates could spend in solitary 
confinement, noting that the lower court had first given the 
state department of corrections a number of chances to fix the 
problem.134 Similarly, in Bounds v. Smith,135 another prison 
reform case, the Court stated that the “courts below 
scrupulously respected the limits on their role” by initially 
holding only that a constitutional guarantee had been 
violated and ordering defendants to devise a remedy 
themselves.136 
It can be difficult even for relatively ardent 
separationists to conceive of structural reform without the 
active and central participation of the judge.137 Some 
commentators have suggested ways in which judges can 
incentivize behavior change within the litigation framework 
that stop short of a complex structural injunction. William 
Fletcher notes, for example, that courts can use options that  
range from soliciting acceptable plans from the parties and 
permitting the defendant to choose among them, to threatening 
  
 132. Cf. Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court, Democracy and 
Institutional Reform Litigation, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 915, 933 (2005) 
[hereinafter Sandler & Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court] (advocating a similar 
approach, but in the context of “soft rights”). 
 133. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
 134. Id. at 687; see also id. (“[T]aking the long and unhappy history of the 
litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a comprehensive order 
to insure against the risk of inadequate compliance.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267, 281 (1977) (explaining that although state and local authorities have 
primary responsibility for curing constitutional violations, the courts may act 
when they fail to meet that obligation). 
 135. 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 136. Id. at 832-33. 
 137. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 193-221 
(proposing new principles to guide structural reform, nearly all of which are 
judge-centered). 
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contempt if a defendant refuses to choose and implement an 
acceptable plan, to threatening to close a prison facility or to release 
prisoners if the state refuses to improve conditions, and even to 
threatening to appoint a receiver.138 
The declaratory judgment is less intrusive than even 
these options, though perhaps closest in temperament to the 
threat of contempt, and far less judge-centered. 
Second, for a variety of doctrinal reasons, there is reason 
to believe that should the parties be unable to settle, 
declaratory judgments would be easier to procure than 
injunctive relief. Plaintiffs seeking solely declaratory relief 
face a lower burden than plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. 
As the Court noted in Steffel, “engrafting upon the 
Declaratory Judgment Act a requirement that all of the 
traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance of an 
injunction be satisfied before the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment is considered would defy Congress’ intent to make 
declaratory relief available in cases where an injunction 
would be inappropriate.”139 There is no requirement to 
demonstrate irreparable injury, as there is for injunctive 
relief,140 or a requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate no 
adequate remedy at law.141 
Relatedly, because structural injunctions cost money to 
implement, defendants often raise immunity and separation 
of powers defenses.142 Although the Court has held that court 
orders requiring expenditures to be made do not violate 
sovereign immunity principles, defendants often contend 
that they do.143 Even if defendants fail (sometimes 
  
 138. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 695. 
 139. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974); see also Fiss, Dombrowski, 
supra note 10, at 1123 (noting that the declaratory judgment is a statutory 
creation, “not moored to the history of equity”). 
 140. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 471-72; see also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73-74 
(1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). 
 141. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 471-72; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 57 (“The existence of 
another adequate remedy does not preclude a declaratory judgment that is 
otherwise appropriate.”); H.R. REP. NO. 73-1264, at 2 (1934). 
 142. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81. 
 143. See id.  
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repeatedly) to prevail on these issues, they often succeed in 
tying up structural reform litigation for years as questions of 
whether there was an adequate remedy at law, or whether 
the relief sought would violate separation of powers 
principles, are resolved by the courts.144 Where only 
declaratory relief is sought, it may be easier for plaintiffs and 
the courts to assuage separation of powers concerns. 
Finally, the mechanics of litigating a declaratory 
judgment action should result in monetary cost-savings. 
William Landes and Richard Posner observe that declaratory 
judgments require an investment of resources only to 
determine liability, not to craft a remedy or quantify 
damages.145 They conclude that “[i]f the losing party will 
comply once the issue of liability is authoritatively resolved, 
he—in fact, both parties, plus the court—can economize on 
the expense of litigation by seeking only declaratory relief.”146 
To be fair, the cost savings may more accurately be 
described as a cost shifting. Unlike the cases on which 
Landes and Posner focus, which are primarily insurance 
related and judicial review of administrative action cases, 
institutional reform cases require extensive investment in 
remedy crafting after the litigation over liability is resolved. 
That investment, however, is arguably reduced by removing 
the obstructionist incentives inherent to the litigation 
dynamic and likely borne by parties more appropriate than 
the court system. The remedies devised may also be more 
likely to procure real compliance and change.147 From a more 
separationist view, declaratory judgments also result in cost-
savings for the courts because they are no longer needed to 
  
 144. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text. 
 145. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory 
Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 699 (1994). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Cf. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 105 (arguing 
that consent decrees seek to enforce “soft rights” and “often call for performance 
whose adequacy is difficult to judge” whereas “[o]fficials can often comply with 
traditional rights by just not doing what is forbidden”). 
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devise and enforce remedies or to remain involved for years 
on end.148  
Furthermore, as others have noted, consent decrees and 
structural injunctions, not to mention settlement 
agreements, are not paragons of transparency.149 It can be 
difficult for anyone beyond the immediate litigating parties 
and the specific additional stakeholders invited to participate 
to figure out how exactly a case was resolved, what precise 
legal principles were applied by the court, and what 
defendants agreed to do going forward.150 To the extent that 
there is transnational adjudication in this context, there is a 
vast information asymmetry that affects primarily 
defendants, who are far less likely to be repeat players than 
plaintiffs’ counsel. Ironically, the information asymmetry has 
adverse effects for plaintiffs’ counsel and their future clients, 
because it forces them to relitigate issues with other 
defendants down the line.  
There will always be defendants who insist on receiving 
their own day in court, but there are undoubtedly others who 
may be persuaded to reform if presented with a broader 
declaration of rights that clearly applies to them.151 A 
statement that x practice violates y right is arguably more 
transferrable and of greater practical import to litigators 
than a specific structural injunction that applies only to one 
particular situation. In some circumstances, it may even be 
possible to leverage this aspect of the declaratory judgment 
to circumvent the need for a class action altogether.152  
  
 148. Cf. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1297, 1302. 
 149. See, e.g., Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation, supra note 111, at 516-18. 
 150. Cf. Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753, 756 
(2012) [hereinafter Bray, Announcing Remedies] (noting the cost-saving benefits 
of announced remedies “because determining the remedy once is cheaper than 
determining it over and over again”).  
 151. Cf. id. at 770 (describing the effects of “meta-announcement,” in which “an 
announced remedy communicates not only what the remedy will be but also that 
the remedy will be the same for everyone”) (emphasis omitted). 
 152. Gary F. Smith & Nu Usaha, Dusting Off the Declaratory Judgment Act: A 
Broad Remedy for Classwide Violations of Federal Law, 32 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
112, 112-13 (July-Aug. 1998) (proposing that legal aid lawyers barred from class 
action practice use the declaratory judgment to obtain relief). 
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D. Beyond Experimentalism  
This Article presents a different path around the Scylla 
and Charybdis, one that is arguably even less interventionist 
than the court-centered variant of democratic 
experimentalism and yet better suited to situations that 
demand structural reform. It contends that at least in the 
context of the paradigmatic structural reform case—
involving an institutional failure to meet legal standards that 
is both big and polycentric—democratic experimentalism is 
simply insufficient to solve the problem. But the criticisms of 
structural injunctions remain, and so the question for 
reformers is how to fill the gap left by their decline even as 
we accept the changes that democratic experimentalism has 
wrought.  
The comments below are intended more to demonstrate 
the inherent shortcomings of experimentalism when there is 
a case for structural reform than to argue that 
experimentalism is ill-advised as an enterprise altogether; 
experimentalism remains a worthy endeavor, but can never 
satisfy all of our reform needs.  
First, experimentalism is at once insufficiently court-
centered and overly so, advocating deference and outside 
participation when the court’s expertise is arguably at its 
greatest—in the liability stage—and court participation 
when its expertise is arguably at its lowest—at the remedy 
stage.153 The model of declaratory judging advocated by this 
Article flips this dynamic of judicial involvement to take 
advantage of core institutional competencies. Courts are 
asked to retain responsibility for determining liability, 
applying law to facts, but are asked to step back from the 
responsibility of structuring remedies.  
Courts are indisputably within their core area of 
expertise when they evaluate a factual situation to determine 
whether rights have been violated. That expertise arguably 
diminishes when they seek to remedy the rights violation by 
  
 153. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 401 (“Experimentalism . . . asks courts to 
involve the parties in exploring the realm of possibilities at the earlier stage of 
determining whether there is a legal violation. For trial courts, experimentalism 
can transform the role of the judge from the traditional Anglo-American model of 
passive referee into an active problem solver . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
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reforming the institution at fault. Declaratory judging asks 
courts to remain well within their core area of expertise and 
defer to the parties (and other stakeholders) on the actual 
task of institutional reform—and, of course, should the 
judgment prove insufficient, motivation to halt the rights 
violations, the model provides for a another bite at the 
apple.154 
Second, experimentalism is (by design) ill-suited to 
providing wholesale, as opposed to retail, reform. Local 
change at an individual level may be appropriate, 
particularly where the problem confronted is “hard” in the 
sense that there is no clear doctrinal answer. But where the 
problem is “big” but less “hard”—as is the case with much of 
the institutional reform needed today, particularly in the 
context of racial justice—more wide-ranging relief is 
appropriate: these problems are by their very nature 
difficult, if not impossible, to tackle via one-off, individual 
litigation.  
Experimentalism is not unsuited for all aspects of 
structural reform—where the issues are both big and hard, 
where the doctrinal answers are unclear, and where both law 
and society are unsettled, the approach suggested by the 
experimentalists may make sense.155 But it is unnecessary 
and ill-suited for big cases that are not very difficult. 
Experimentalism as applied to those cases responds on a 
scale that is at once too large and too small, offering 
widespread court involvement but on an individual level, 
complaint by complaint, court case by court case. In contrast, 
declaratory judgments offer larger scale involvement on the 
group level but less overall involvement by courts, in the form 
of one declaration of liability for defendants’ actions affecting 
a class of people, which is then leveraged to generate the 
  
 154. Dorf in fact identifies a place for this type of solution, noting that there is 
a version of the judicial/legislative dialogue “solution that bears a substantial 
resemblance to experimentalism . . . . A court might find that some challenged 
law or practice violates constitutional or other legal norms and order the 
legislature to adopt some solution, without specifying the precise contours of that 
solution.” Dorf, supra note 3, at 978. 
 155. Cf. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 7-8.  
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political accountability necessary to create a practical 
solution. 
The experimentalist reply is to sing the praises of judicial 
modesty.156 The point of this Section is to suggest that judicial 
modesty also has a price, and it is one that rises in proportion 
to the size and intractability of the root institutional problem. 
Problem-solving courts offer retail-level solutions to 
individuals and the relief is either retrospective or designed 
to help a criminal defendant navigate through their 
prosecution, as in the case of drug courts. They are ill-
equipped to provide wholesale solutions to class-wide 
problems, and wholly unequipped to provide prospective 
relief.157 Even the large-scale experimentalism that Sabel and 
Simon cite with approval, such as consent decrees providing 
for out-put oriented benchmarks rather than in-put oriented 
oversight, is the result of large-scale litigation in which 
plaintiffs’ counsel committed vast institutional resources 
long after the original named plaintiffs were 
deinstitutionalized.158 In contrast to experimentalism, 
declaratory judgments can produce wholesale, as opposed to 
retail, sorting, accommodating class-based relief across a 
broad spectrum of institutional practices.159 
Third, the experimentalist model envisions (and indeed, 
places a premium upon) multilateral stakeholder 
participation, but is not particularly effective when it comes 
to actually ensuring that all stakeholders have an equal place 
at the table. Persons whose rights have been violated by an 
institution are often unable, unwilling, or unsuited to 
  
 156. Dorf, supra note 3, at 942 (“A problem-solving court faces fewer competency 
obstacles than a court overseeing structural reform because the former does not 
itself run any institutions, nor does it place itself atop a hierarchical organization 
of personnel resentful of its authority.”). 
 157. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive 
Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1216 (2000). 
 158. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1028 (citing with approval 
the consent decree in a case in which the parties litigated for more than two 
decades over defendants’ repeated failures to comply with the law). 
 159. Cf. Bray, Preventative Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1317-18 (contending 
that federal courts issuing declaratory relief participate in retail sorting, which 
results in “less judicial expertise, less accessibility to low-income plaintiffs, and 
more forum shopping. These drawbacks may help explain the seemingly 
moribund condition of the federal declaratory judgment.”). 
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bringing about institutional reform. To the extent these 
individuals are the subject of litigation, it is usually because 
they are being prosecuted, as in the case of drug courts and 
other experimental trial-level court systems. The facts 
presented by the paradigmatic case for structural reform 
involve institutions with sufficient control over a group of 
people to be able to violate their rights.  
The persons affected, like prison inmates or students, 
necessarily have less power over their lives than others and, 
by extension, less of the leverage needed to bring those who 
run the institution to the bargaining table. There is little 
incentive to bring institutionalized persons to the bargaining 
table in the absence of litigation that they themselves have 
initiated as plaintiffs. A political process attempting to 
restructure prison practices, for example, is less likely to 
bring inmates to the negotiating table than it is to bring other 
institutional stakeholders. Plaintiff initiated litigation is still 
needed to enable the participation of these most essential 
stakeholders. 
The declaratory judgment model recognizes that the 
stakeholders in the types of cases at hand are typically (and 
often literally) disenfranchised and that their needs are often 
served by organizations that have the resources needed to 
bring suit on their behalf, such as those dedicated to 
disability rights or civil liberties. This mediated participation 
may be of even greater importance where there is public 
resistance to direct participation by the stakeholders at 
issue.160  
E. Some Disadvantages 
Despite the myriad advantages described above, the 
declaratory judgment has been under-utilized in the context 
of civil rights reform. Plenty of lawsuits seek it, but only in 
conjunction with injunctive relief, eviscerating its true value. 
There are a number of reasons this is likely the case, but this 
Article contends a combination of risk adversity, inertia, and 
optimism is at work. Litigators seeking structural reform 
  
 160. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1037 (acknowledging the 
strong “public resistance to participation in policymaking and administration by 
prisoners and their advocates”).  
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have taken insufficient notice of the increased reluctance of 
courts to issue sweeping structural injunctions and fear 
having to relitigate cases in the event that defendants defy a 
declaratory judgment; they ask for both types of relief 
because they and everyone they know have always done so 
and they believe that it is always possible the court will issue 
the structural injunction of their dreams. This Article urges 
close reconsideration of this dynamic. 
Seeking solely declaratory relief in civil rights cases is, of 
course, not without its downsides, only some of which are 
predictable at this moment. If and when plaintiffs’ counsel 
begin to bring these types of cases, defendants and courts will 
have a hand in shaping the challenges they will face and a 
new litigation dynamic will inevitably result. And some 
aspects of the old dynamic will remain unchanged, as there 
is only so much the declaratory judgment can do. The usual 
rules on abstention will still apply, for example, as will the 
various restrictions governing standing.161 
First and foremost, seeking solely declaratory relief will 
likely result in the relitigation of at least some cases. 
Declaratory judgments may be binding in subsequent 
litigation only if the same plaintiff is involved, and, if 
defendants disregard the declaration issued, plaintiffs must 
return to the court for an injunction.162 These wrinkles are 
problems presented by what we might call the bad-faith 
defendant. Should the plaintiffs return to court, they may of 
course procure an injunction, but at the expense of additional 
litigation costs and, on top of that, the facts to which the court 
previously applied the law will likely have shifted by the time 
the non-compliance has been ascertained.  
Plaintiffs seeking an injunction will functionally need to 
rebuild their case on the basis of these new facts, many of 
which will be the result of changes in the defendants’ 
behavior and thus calculated to reduce or eliminate liability. 
Defendants may defy a declaration insofar as they refuse to 
fully comply with legal norms, but adjust their behavior just 
enough to make it harder for plaintiffs to argue that they are 
  
 161. See supra notes 44 & 124 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989). 
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still in non-compliance.163 This is not a new phenomenon, 
however, as structural reform defendants are always free to 
adjust their behavior at any point during the life of a lawsuit 
prior to settlement or judgment regardless of the type of relief 
sought. If the adjustment is sufficiently significant, the need 
for further proceedings may be mooted. More often, when it 
is not, plaintiffs must adjust their litigation posture and 
invest resources in additional discovery, new expert reports, 
etc.  
Another disadvantage to declaratory relief is that the 
reform implemented may not be as sweeping as that which a 
court would issue. As noted above, some commentators have 
identified a gap between what the law requires and what 
structural injunctions require.164 This disparity may be a 
problem from a separationist perspective, but reformers are 
presumably more than happy to take advantage. When the 
outcome is reform via negotiated settlement, there is no 
functional difference, but where a judgment is actually 
issued, the declaratory judgment model may result in 
narrower solutions because they will be the result of political 
bargaining and not judicially imposed.  
The bargaining process will also differ from the 
settlement negotiation process because more stakeholders 
will likely be involved, further muddying the waters and 
introducing competing resource needs—the prison official 
may now be at the same table with the school official, 
competing for the same limited pot of resources. However, it 
is equally likely that where the judge is a separationist, 
judicially or ideologically conservative, or otherwise hostile 
to reformers’ claims, the declaratory judgment model can 
make reform more likely to take place and result in broader 
reform than the law would require because the political 
parties are free to make new law where the judge is not. 
  
 163. See, e.g., Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 55 (noting the problem of forcing 
judges to choose “between a heavy and frequent use of criminal contempt power 
or an endless series of declarations of what was unacceptable”); cf. Bray, 
Preventative Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1295 (noting that “the resolution of 
fact-based indeterminacy has less preclusive or precedential force [because] the 
parties are not locked in: they have time to change their conduct”). 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14. 
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The resultant uncertainty may be discomfiting to some, 
but the process envisioned by this Article is one in which the 
substantive bargaining process is largely the same as in that 
produced by the traditional lawsuit seeking both an 
injunction and a declaration, just a bargaining process that 
the parties are able to arrive at in a more expeditious 
manner. As with new governance, this model of litigation and 
negotiation requires some amount of “optimis[m] about 
uncertainty and doubt.”165 
Finally, just as there are some doctrinal advantages to 
seeking solely declaratory relief, the law also imposes at least 
one major doctrinal handicap. The ability of plaintiffs’ 
counsel to secure attorneys fees may be compromised.166 This 
factor is obviously relevant, but should not be critical. Since 
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Resources,167 plaintiffs’ 
counsel have been unable to recover attorneys fees under 
Section 1988 and other federal statutes as the “prevailing 
party” under the theory that their lawsuit was merely a 
catalyst for change.168 Although fees are still recoverable in 
the event a consent decree is entered, most structural reform 
cases settle well before that takes place and therefore would 
not be amenable to fees collection anyway. Perhaps relatedly, 
because so much institutional reform litigation brought today 
is initiated by well-established non-profits who receive 
foundation and private funding, as well as support from the 
private bar, it is not as dependent upon attorneys fees as, for 
example, individual cases filed for purely retrospective 
damages relief.  
IV. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN ACTION  
The remainder of the Article will explore how strategic 
use of the declaratory judgment action can streamline 
systemic reform litigation in the real world, providing a 
  
 165. Lobel, supra note 3, at 395. 
 166. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (holding that a declaratory 
judgment “will constitute relief, for purposes of § 1988, if, and only if, it affects 
the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff”). 
 167. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
 168. Id. at 610. 
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practical view of how the theoretical efficiencies identified 
might play out. It will argue that actions seeking solely 
declaratory relief should result in meaningful improvement 
in four phases of litigated reform: pre-filing and claim 
structuring, motions to dismiss, remedy identification and 
implementation, and enforcement/deterrence.  
This Part will draw from a variety of on-going areas of 
structural reform, such as public defense reform, school-to-
prison pipeline reform, and prison reform. Rather than 
second-guessing failed efforts, it will focus on cases in which 
litigators actually procured reform, whether through a 
settlement agreement, a consent decree, other court-ordered 
relief, or as a catalyst for institutional change. It will also 
take as a given the current litigation and reform environment 
as described above.169 Given the undeniable success reformers 
have had with the traditional model, which invariably seeks 
both declaratory and injunctive relief, one might reasonably 
ask why we should fix something that is not broken: because 
the litigation could and should be made more streamlined 
and efficient; because the cost of entry to file one of these 
cases has grown almost prohibitively expensive, dissuading 
advocates with fewer resources from filing anything at all; 
and because these successful efforts can and should be 
replicated more easily and cost-effectively.  
A. Pre-filing, Claim Structuring, and Discovery 
The pre-filing process is often a significant component of 
structural reform, both in terms of cost, resource allocation, 
and time. Plaintiffs’ counsel must typically invest significant 
time and resources investigating and structuring their 
claims, not to mention recruiting pro bono counsel. Where 
they seek to reform a number of institutions all committing 
the same rights violations at once, counsel frequently file on 
behalf of persons affected by each individual institution or at 
a minimum number of representative institutions. The pre-
filing investigation can be exhaustive (and exhausting) as 
attorneys must gather information, documents, and 
plaintiffs from each institution and take the additional step 
of weighing which ones to actually name. In the indigent 
  
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 72-80. 
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defense reform context, for example, litigators expend a vast 
amount of resources conducting research and gathering data 
in a number of counties across a given state in an effort to 
demonstrate that the deficiency in services is state-wide.  
A bloated claim structure results in increased costs 
throughout the life of the case, in the form of more 
complicated motions to dismiss (e.g., with different 
defendants filing separate motions, or more defenses to raise) 
and greater discovery needs (e.g., in the form of depositions 
and document requests). Perhaps in part because these costs 
are now largely borne by law firms, the traditional model of 
litigation in some areas of structural reform is increasingly 
cumbersome, expensive, and time-consuming.170 For 
example, public defense reform litigation filed in the last ten 
years has largely hewed to a class action model that requests 
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of indigent 
criminal defendants who have not yet been convicted.171 The 
complaint is typically an exhaustive account of all the various 
shortcomings of the public defense system in question, 
covering aspects like funding, supervision, training, and the 
performance of indigent defense counsel.172 Relief is often 
sought against a variety of defendants, and, where the state 
is sued, the plaintiff class includes members from a range of 
  
 170. One description of the on-going litigation over the public defense services 
provided in New York State noted that lead counsel in the case has been “assisted 
by a team of dozens of lawyers at Schulte Roth & Zabel, who have committed more 
than 20,000 hours to the case and absorbed more than $500,000 in expenses.” 
Seth Stern, Standing up for Gideon’s Mandate, HARV. L. BULL., Winter 2014, at 
46. The case was filed in 2007 and is still pending. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Wilbur 
v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 2:11-cv-01100 RSL (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2011) 
[hereinafter Wilbur Complaint]; Complaint, Duncan v. State, No. 07-000242-CZ 
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 2007) [hereinafter Duncan Complaint]; Amended Complaint, 
White v. Martz, No. C DV-2002-133 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Apr. 14, 2002) 
[hereinafter White Complaint]; Amended Class Action Complaint, Hurrell-
Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Hurrell-
Harring Complaint]; Complaint, Flora v. Luzerne Cnty., No. 04517 (Pa. C.P. Apr. 
10, 2012) [hereinafter Flora Complaint]. 
 172. See, e.g., Wilbur Complaint, supra note 171; Duncan Complaint, supra note 
171; White Complaint, supra note 171; Hurrell-Harring Complaint, supra note 
171; Flora Complaint, supra note 171. 
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counties from across the state and allegations in the 
complaint include sections for each of those counties.173  
One case recently filed in 2014, for example, seeks 
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of four juvenile 
and four adult named plaintiffs against the state of Georgia, 
the governor, a variety of state and county officials from four 
counties, an array of juvenile and superior court judges, 
public defenders, and district attorneys.174 The complaint, 
which is eighty-three pages long (excluding exhibits), lists 
four attorneys from the Southern Center for Human Rights 
and eight from Arnold & Porter, LLP.175  
Although much of the litigation model cannot be changed 
by virtue of doctrinal necessity, a move towards a request for 
solely declaratory judgment would streamline the pre-filing 
and claim structuring process.176 Plaintiffs could file 
litigation seeking declaratory relief with respect to only one 
institution, leveraging success against that particular 
institution against all other similarly situated institutions. 
In the context of public defense reform, they could sue on the 
basis of the facts in only one county in the state and name 
only one defendant: the state. The declaration requested 
could be that the state is ultimately responsible for the 
provision of public defense services in that particular county 
and that the services as described in that county fall below 
the constitutional minimum. Although the state could then 
choose to fix the system only with respect to that one 
particular county, plaintiffs could and should seek to 
leverage that declaration against the state with respect to all 
other counties. One could imagine a similar reform structure 
  
 173. In White v. Martz, for example, plaintiffs sued seven out of Montana’s fifty-
six counties. See White Complaint, supra note 171, at 1-2. In Michigan, plaintiffs 
discussed three out of Michigan’s eighty-seven counties. See Duncan Complaint, 
supra note 171. In New York, plaintiffs discuss the pitfalls in five of New York’s 
sixty-two counties. See Hurrell-Harring Complaint, supra note 171. 
 174. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Darden ex rel. N.P. v. 
State, No. 2014CV241025 (Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2014). 
 175. Id. at 84-85. 
 176. Plaintiffs will still likely want to seek class certification, for example, and 
rely on extensive pleadings cataloging the various deficiencies of the system in 
question. 
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for prison conditions cases and, depending upon the state, 
school cases. 
Perhaps of greatest relevance to this calculus is the fact 
that the primary goal of plaintiffs is to drive defendants to 
the bargaining table. Although reformers in the public 
defense context have had some victories in the form of 
definitive court orders,177 most cases have been resolved by 
state legislative action, sometimes even prior to the filing of 
intended litigation.178 Members of the plaintiff class lack the 
political leverage to spur reform in the absence of a lawsuit, 
but there is no reason for the lawsuit that provides the 
leverage to be as unwieldy as some of those recently filed.  
B. Motions to Dismiss 
There are a number of doctrinal areas in which filing 
solely for declaratory relief would streamline the motion to 
dismiss process across a spectrum of public interest cases. 
For example, arguments related to the separation of powers, 
sovereign immunity, and justiciability would be largely 
foreclosed (barring other independent issues). Institutional 
reform cases typically request relief in the form of things like 
special food for prisoners, training for school personnel, or 
adequately resourced attorneys for indigent criminal 
defendants. These things cost money, which must eventually 
and ultimately come from the legislature. Defendants often 
contend that these requests for relief would violate 
separation of powers principles because a court order would 
require the legislature to spend money;179 that various state 
  
 177. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. 
Wash. 2013); Settlement Agreement, Best v. Grant Cnty., No. 04-2-00189-0 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2005). 
 178. See, e.g., Idaho Public Defense Act, ch. 247, 2014 Idaho Sess. Laws 616 (to 
be codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-848 to -850, 19-853, 19-859 to -8620; 
Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act, Act No. 93, 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts 53 
(codified at Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 780.981-780.1003 (2013)); Montana Public 
Defender Act, ch. 449, 2005 Mont. Laws 1564 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 41-
3-425, 47-1-104 to -105, 47-1-202 (2012)). 
 179. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 284 Mich. App. 246, 276-84 (2009) (describing 
and analyzing defendants’ argument court could not order legislature to expend 
money); Motion to Dismiss at 12-14, Flora v. Luzerne, 3:13-cv-01478-MEM (M.D. 
Pa. June 21, 2013) (arguing the court cannot mandate additional funding for the 
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immunity doctrines are implicated because plaintiffs 
functionally seek an appropriation from the legislature, akin 
to money damages;180 or that the claims are not justiciable.181  
It is immaterial that courts reject these defenses because 
the mere fact of their existence prolongs and needlessly 
complicates the litigation. A case seeking public defense 
reform filed in Michigan in 2007, following two years of active 
investigation by the ACLU and the Brennan Center for 
Justice, was only recently resolved in 2013.182 The state 
supreme court granted two motions for reconsideration 
(reversing itself, only to re-reverse itself)183 and ultimately 
denied two additional requests for reconsideration.184 
Hundreds of pages worth of duplicative motions were filed in 
the intervening years before the plaintiffs eventually 
  
public defender office unless it would affect the court’s own ability to administer 
justice); Defendants-Appellants’ Consolidated Brief, Duncan v. State, No. 278652, 
278858, 278860 (Mich. Ct. App. May 30, 2008) [hereinafter Defendants-
Appellants’ Consolidated Brief]; Brief for Respondents, Hurrell-Harring v. State, 
No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Dec. 4, 2009). 
 180. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 284 Mich. App. 246, 266-71 (2009) (discussing 
defendants’ immunity claims); Defendants’ Brief in Support of their Motion to 
Dismiss at 23-24, Stempfle ex rel. D.B. v. Granholm, No. 2:06-cv-13548-NGE-DAS 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2007). 
 181. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
at 3, Harris v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., No. 1:08-CV-01435-CC (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 
2008) [hereinafter AISS Motion to Dismiss] (systemic litigation over alternative 
school); see also, e.g., Letter from Janice L. Birnbaum & Abigail Goldenberg to 
Hon. Allyne Ross at 2 (Mar. 22, 2005), J.G. v. Mills, No. 1:04-cv-05415-ARR-SMG 
(E.D.N.Y.) (arguing that school reform case should be dismissed because 20 
U.S.C. § 1232(a) prohibits federal “direction, supervision or control” over state 
educational institutions); State’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Joint Petition at 8-15, Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Wyoming, No. 129-59 (D. Wyo. 
Sept. 8, 2004) (arguing court should defer to legislative process in school funding 
case); State’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First General Cause of Action (The 
Education Clause Claims) at 2-3, Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756CI (Sup. Ct. 
Alaska Dec. 21, 2004) (same). 
 182. Duncan Complaint, supra note 171. In the interests of full disclosure, the 
author was the lead attorney on the Michigan investigation, the primary author 
of the complaint, and argued the motion to dismiss before the county court.  
 183. Duncan v. State, 780 N.W.2d 843, rev’d, 784 N.W.2d 51, rev’d, 790 N.W.2d 
695 (Mich. 2010). 
 184. Duncan v. State, 795 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. 2011); Duncan v. State, 791 
N.W.2d 721 (Mich. 2010); Duncan v. State, 795 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. 2011). 
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prevailed, six years after the complaint was first filed and 
without taking any discovery in the case.185 And the 
resolution did not come via a court-ordered injunction, but 
rather bi-partisan legislation to create a state-funded public 
defense system after a number of favorable court rulings.186 
Because litigation seeking solely declaratory relief would 
not in and of itself require any additional expenditures by the 
legislature—which would be free to work out a political 
solution to the problem—or a court takeover of a state 
institution, it appears likely that this line of motion practice 
could be side-stepped. 
Defendants in these cases often also contend that 
plaintiffs have not suffered or are not at imminent risk of 
suffering irreparable harm and that they have an adequate 
remedy at law.187 This line of reasoning typically amounts to 
an administrative exhaustion argument, that plaintiffs 
should undergo individual adjudication through the 
institutions’ established processes before resorting to the 
court system.188 In the public defense context, for example, 
defendants argue that plaintiffs’ adequate remedy at law is 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim or motions to 
  
 185. See Defendants-Appellants’ Consolidated Brief, supra note 179. 
 186. Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act, Act No. 93, 2013 Mich. Pub. 
Acts 53 (codified at Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 780.981-780.1003 (2013)); Duncan v. 
State, 832 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (permitting plaintiffs to proceed with 
class discovery). 
 187. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint at 5, Hornsby ex rel. J.A. v. Barbour, No. 
3:07cv394DPJ-JCS (S.D. Miss. Feb. 1, 2008) (making these arguments in suit over 
state run juvenile training institution); SAO Defendants’ Combined 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26-27, First Def. Legal Aid v. City 
of Chicago, No. 01 C 9671 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2002) (making these arguments in 
suit over practices at state attorney’s office); Defendant, Secretary Michael 
Moore’s Motion to Dismiss the Individual Plaintiffs on Statute of Limitations 
Grounds at 8-10, NAACP v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 500-CV-157-OC-10 
(M.D. Fla. May 3, 2000) (action against prison). 
 188. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 31-35, 
ACLU of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Acad., No. 09-CV-138 DWF/JJG (D. Minn. Apr. 
21, 2009); Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 2-
7, Bill M. v. Neb. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 4:03CV3189 (D. Neb. Nov. 24, 
2003). 
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substitute counsel,189 and in the schools context, it is 
individual school administrative hearings.190 Because 
plaintiffs need not allege they do not have an adequate 
remedy at law for declaratory relief, there is ample reason to 
believe that defendants would no longer raise these 
arguments on motion to dismiss (absent a statutory 
requirement to exhaust). 
C. Remedy  
The traditional model of structural reform litigation 
explicitly envisions extensive and prolonged court 
involvement during the remedial phase of the litigation, as 
the court plays an integral role in designing the remedy and 
in its enforcement.191 This involvement comes at undeniable 
cost to the court system itself, as judges must oversee 
proceedings and negotiations; magistrate judges, special 
masters, and monitors must be appointed and report back to 
the court; consent decrees must be reviewed and approved; 
and injunctions crafted and enforced. It is not unusual for 
plaintiffs to attempt to prolong the court’s involvement, 
assuming that continued court involvement will procure 
better results and ensure greater compliance from 
defendants. 
In a school-to-prison pipeline reform case filed by the 
ACLU in 2006, for example, plaintiffs succeeded in procuring 
a comprehensive consent decree after mediation before a 
magistrate judge.192 The case challenged racially 
discriminatory discipline practices affecting Native 
American students in a South Dakota school district.193 In 
addition to prohibiting defendants from requiring students to 
  
 189. See, e.g., Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Wilbur v. City 
of Mt. Vernon, 2:11-cv-01100-RSL (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2011). 
 190. See, e.g., AISS Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 10 (“Having failed to 
avail themselves of their statutory remedy, Plaintiffs are now barred from seeking 
equitable relief . . . .”). 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. 
 192. Consent Decree, Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2, No. 3:06-03007-CBK 
(D.S.D. Dec. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Antoine Consent Decree].  
 193. Complaint, Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2, No. 3:06-03007-CBK (D.S.D. 
Mar. 27, 2006). 
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make statements that could be used against them in a 
juvenile or criminal court proceeding, the decree required 
defendants to: (1) abide by Fifth Amendment norms after 
deciding to refer a student to law enforcement; (2) provide 
annual trainings on the constitutional rights of students, 
Native American education and educational equity, and 
student-on-student conflict resolution; (3) retain an expert to 
develop discipline procedures that would eliminate 
mandatory police referrals, define discrete categories of 
misconduct, set forth appropriate consequences for 
misconduct, and incorporate the use of traditional Native 
American practices; (4) maintain consistent and accurate 
records of disciplinary incidents; (5) evaluate all students 
disciplined three or more times in an academic year; (6) hire 
a Native American ombudsperson and establish a Principal’s 
Advisory Committee; (7) provide a series of specific Native 
American classes, programs, and activities; (8) increase the 
number of Native American employees; (9) improve parental 
participation; (10) invite the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Education 
Department to participate in school board meetings; (11) 
retain a monitor to oversee defendants’ activities; and (12) 
develop and meet benchmarks regarding graduation rates, 
school discipline, academic achievement and other factors.194  
The court was to retain jurisdiction for four consecutive 
school years.195 In 2014, eight years after the original 
complaint was filed, the ACLU sought an amendment to the 
consent decree: “Rather than risking the possibility of having 
the Original Consent Decree end in its entirety, the Amended 
Consent Decree is intended to be in effect for either the next 
two or four years” depending upon the school district’s ability 
to meet certain outcome measures.196  
This Article argues that court involvement with remedial 
processes like these may in some instances be streamlined 
when only a declaratory judgment is sought. Short, targeted 
periods of court involvement could and would be 
contemplated where defendants defy the declaration, act in 
  
 194. Antoine Consent Decree, supra note 192, at 2-15. 
 195. Id. at 16. 
 196. Notice of Proposed Amendment to Consent Decree in School 
Discrimination Lawsuit at 2, Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2, No. 3:06-cv-
03007-CBK (D.S.D. Jan. 8, 2014). 
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bad faith, or fail to implement appropriate institutional 
reform. But, long, broad, and continuous court involvement 
would no longer be the norm.  
D. Enforcement and Deterrence 
In the vast majority of cases, the declaratory judgment 
model will likely resolve disputes in the same way the 
traditional model does, with a settlement agreement. There 
are meaningful differences, however, when they do not. 
Consent decrees are notoriously difficult to locate even when 
one has knowledge of a particular decree’s existence.197 Both 
they and structural injunctions can be strikingly specific to 
the particular institution subject to a particular lawsuit.198 
This Article contends that more widespread and thoughtful 
use of declaratory judgments may result in increased 
transparency, transferability, and deterrence via the 
articulation of constitutional norms. If the other efficiencies 
identified above hold, they may also result in increased 
litigation activity which can itself increase deterrence. We 
can reasonably assume that at least some institutional 
defendants choose not to undertake institutional reform 
because they believe no one has the resources to sue them 
and/or they believe they might as well wait until someone 
does. The efficiencies identified in this section are most 
salient where a number of similarly situated institutions are 
suspected of committing the same or similar rights 
violations, i.e., where “meta-structural reform” may be 
needed. 
Where the outcome is negotiated reform, there is no 
functional difference, but declaratory judgments actually 
issued that find particular actions to be rights violating 
should be easier to locate, summarize, and circulate than the 
contents of consent decrees and structural injunctions. They 
should also be more easily applicable to other potential 
defendants—although they will have no preclusive effect, 
they serve as powerful evidence that subsequent litigation 
over the same or similar behavior would be similarly 
  
 197. See supra text accompanying note 149-50. 
 198. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 194 (describing consent decree 
issued in Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2). 
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successful. This dynamic should be particularly forceful 
where the litigation filed is purely rights-determining, as in 
the religious freedom of exercise cases in various institutions, 
such as prisons. These cases seek a simple adjudication of 
rights: whether prisoners have a right to the particular item 
or activity requested. The ability to replicate results quickly, 
cheaply, and effectively should be particularly compelling in 
this context; the applicable law is a federal statute, many 
would-be plaintiffs lack funds and access to litigation 
resources, and similar issues are presumably widespread. 
And yet plaintiffs’ counsel in these cases consistently 
seek declaratory relief only in conjunction with injunctive 
relief, with little to no value added as a result of the 
injunctive relief. In Moussazadeh v. Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice, for example, attorneys from the Becket 
Fund (which specializes in litigating religious liberty cases) 
and Latham & Watkins LLP sought both declaratory and 
injunctive relief on behalf of a Jewish prisoner who had been 
denied kosher food in violation of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).199 Six months 
after the suit was filed, the district court stayed discovery at 
the request of the parties to permit settlement 
negotiations.200 A year later, Texas began to offer kosher food 
in many of its prison dining halls.201 The litigation 
recommenced when the original plaintiff, who was still 
incarcerated, committed disciplinary infractions and was 
transferred to a unit that offered kosher food only for 
purchase.202 The Fifth Circuit eventually ruled that the 
prison’s practices had substantially burdened the plaintiff’s 
ability to exercise his religious beliefs and remanded the case 
to the district court.203  
  
 199. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Attorneys Fees; And 
Demand for Jury Trial, Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t Criminal Justice, No. 3:07-cv-
00574 (E.D. Tex., Oct. 12, 2005).  
 200. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
 201. Id. at 785-86. 
 202. Id. at 786. 
 203. Id. at 794. 
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Several aspects of this case are noteworthy. First and 
foremost, within months, the lawsuit successfully provided 
the leverage necessary to get defendants to the bargaining 
table and in large part procured the relief requested. Second, 
the Fifth Circuit ruling functioned largely as a declaration of 
rights, holding that forcing Jewish inmates to pay for kosher 
food is a substantial burden for the purposes of RLUIPA and 
that prisons seeking to do so must demonstrate that it is the 
least restrictive alternative.204 The parties could either 
appeal this functional declaration, work through it on their 
own in conjunction with the political and administrative 
agency processes, seek additional guidance from a court on 
remand, or all of the above.205 The request for injunctive relief 
neither drove the outcome of the case nor improved it, and a 
lawsuit that sought solely declaratory relief might well have 
resulted in a clearer statement from the courts more readily 
transferable to other prison systems and claims.  
These observations hold true even where plaintiffs 
succeed in procuring a consent decree for all intents and 
purposes identical to a structural injunction. For example, in 
a case over an inmate’s right under RLUIPA to obtain and 
use eagle feathers in connection with Native American 
religious exercises, the ACLU obtained a consent decree 
tethered to changes the Wyoming Department of Corrections 
made to its Handbook of Religious Beliefs.206 After litigation, 
the handbook was edited to permit Native American 
prisoners up to four eagle feathers, with the proviso that they 
“may be kept as loose feathers or may be bound together with 
string, sinew, or beaded string,” in addition to “a feather fan 
comprised of more than four feathers . . . for group 
activities . . . .”207 A declaration of rights pursuant to RLUIPA 
would arguably be of greater use to future plaintiffs.  
  
 204. Id. at 795-96. 
 205. In Moussazadeh, defendants did actually seek an en banc hearing but were 
denied. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 709 F.3d 487, 488 (5th 
Cir. 2013). 
 206. Consent Decree and Order of Dismissal, Yellowbear v. Lampert, No. 08-
CV-013J (D. Wyo. July 29, 2008). 
 207. Id. at 2. 
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E. Protecting Future Structural Reform Efforts  
Although not properly a phase of litigation, one 
additional way in which declaratory judging may better meet 
the constraints of the new reform era is by preserving and 
protecting structural reform as an option for future 
generations of litigators. In 2013, federal district court Judge 
Shira Scheindlin issued a truly Fissian structural injunction 
against the New York City police department pursuant to a 
decision finding its stop and frisk policies and practices 
unconstitutional.208 What at first appeared a powerful 
repudiation of the premise of this Article evolved into a 
political firestorm that underscores how urgent and 
important it is for litigators to recognize the emerging new 
era of public interest reform.  
The Floyd and Ligon cases were brought, litigated, and 
adjudicated pursuant to the old rules. As the Second Circuit 
later described it, “[t]en days before Judge Scheindlin’s 
supervisory authority under the settlement agreement [in a 
different case] was set to expire, she heard argument on a 
motion brought by the . . . plaintiffs to extend the settlement 
period” and counseled them to file a lawsuit.209 In the manner 
of the prototypical “hero judge,”210 she stated, “[i]f you got 
proof of inappropriate racial profiling in a good constitutional 
case, why don’t you bring a lawsuit? You can certainly mark 
it as related.”211 Plaintiffs’ counsel—which included the New 
York Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional 
Rights, Shearman & Sterling LLP, and Covington & Burling 
LLP—obliged, filing suit seeking declaratory and injunctive 
  
 208. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 209. Ligon v. City of New York (In re Reassignment of Cases), 736 F.3d 118, 124 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
 210. Scheindlin’s judging style is presumably informed and influenced by her 
personal experiences serving as a special master. See Jeffrey Toobin, Rights and 
Wrongs: A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk, THE NEW YORKER (May 27, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/05/27/130527fa_fact_toobin?current
Page=all; cf. Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 3. 
 211. Joseph Goldstein, Court Blocks Stop-and-Frisk Changes for New York 
Police, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/nyregion/
court-blocks-stop-and-frisk-changes-for-new-york-police.html?_r=0. 
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relief, and marking the cases as related to the earlier case, 
which was over the city’s racial profiling practices.212  
The injunction Judge Scheindlin eventually issued was 
majestic in scope, seemingly a dream come true for plaintiffs’ 
counsel. It begins with the premise that “the court has the 
power to order broad equitable relief,” including “broad 
authority to enter injunctive relief.”213 Among other things, it 
requires the city to appoint a particular monitor to oversee 
the required reforms and specifies the monitor’s roles and 
functions; orders a joint remedial process, and specifies how 
that process is to be carried out; requires that certain police 
department forms be revised; requires the police to provide 
narrative descriptions of stops in activity logs; requires the 
police department to transmit a message about the court’s 
ruling over its internal messaging system; and orders the 
department to implement a one year pilot project testing the 
use of body cameras.214  
Roughly two months later, the fallout began. The Second 
Circuit granted Defendants’ request for a stay and, in an 
unusual order, also found that “the appearance of 
impartiality had been compromised by certain statements 
made by Judge Scheindlin during proceedings in the district 
court and in media interviews.”215 It reassigned the case to a 
different district judge, to be chosen randomly.216 It also 
issued a subsequent opinion explaining the basis for and 
superseding that order.217 Judge Scheindlin retained counsel 
for herself, including four law professors, who filed a brief on 
her behalf before the Second Circuit.218 The entire kerfuffle 
  
 212. Complaint, Ligon v. City of New York, No. 1:12-cv-02274 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
28, 2012); Complaint, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 1:08-cv-01034 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
31, 2008). 
 213. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 671, 674. 
 214. Id. at 676-89. 
 215. Ligon v. City of New York (In re Reassignment of Cases), 736 F.3d 118, 121 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
 216. Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 217. Ligon, 736 F.3d at 129. 
 218. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Last Word on Stop-and-Frisk?, THE NEW YORKER 
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/11/the-
last-word-on-stop-and-frisk.html. 
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was eventually mooted on January 1, 2014, with the 
inauguration of a new New York City mayor, who had 
campaigned in part on promises to reform the stop and frisk 
policies of the police department and who vowed to drop the 
city’s appeal.219 
The saga of the Floyd and Ligon cases offers a number of 
lessons for reformers, who ultimately got what they 
wanted—an end to racially charged stop and frisk practices 
in New York City—but through the political process rather 
than litigation. Although they requested and initially 
received a structural injunction from a judge who by all 
intents was committed to “doing justice” in the Fissian sense, 
that injunction was never implemented and the backlash 
against it from within the courts was fierce. It is futile to 
speculate as to whether a declaration of illegality would have 
been greeted in the same manner, but the injunction was 
issued in the context of a judge-prompted, centered, and 
managed litigation, and that judicial centricity was at the 
heart of the Second Circuit’s objections. The Floyd and Ligon 
litigation and ensuing remedies opinion were, in other words, 
everything the new era is not.220 
CONCLUSION 
Brown has served as a touchstone for generations of 
public interest lawyers and its gravitational pull is hard to 
escape. The story it tells is a compelling one for those who 
seek to do justice, engendering hope in those who see the need 
for wide-scale institutional change. But the model of reform 
  
 219. Ligon v. City of New York, 743 F.3d 362, 365 (2d Cir. 2014) (granting city’s 
motion to remand to district court for settlement discussions and refusing to 
decide motions by police unions to intervene in case). 
 220. In Judge Scheindlin’s defense, she gave defendants a first bite at the apple 
by welcoming them to the bargaining table and issued the injunction only after 
the city refused to participate. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 
674-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“I have always recognized the need for caution in ordering 
remedies that affect the internal operations of the NYPD, the nation’s largest 
municipal police force and an organization with over 35,000 members. I would 
have preferred that the City cooperate in a joint undertaking to develop some of 
the remedies ordered in this Opinion. Instead, the City declined to 
participate . . . .”) (footnotes omitted). 
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it has inspired has grown cumbersome and increasingly ill-
suited to the legal, political, and social pressures of our time.  
This Article urges not so much a repudiation of Brown in 
the face of these pressures as a reconceptualization: 
reformers must re-read Brown I and Brown II together in 
their proper historical context.221 Brown I ended in a 
declaration of constitutional rights and an invitation to the 
South to participate in the process of crafting a remedy.222 
Fifty-four weeks passed between Brown I and Brown II, 
during which time a number of communities voluntarily 
desegregated their schools and others announced they would 
resist.223 Prior to the hearing in Brown II, the Court received 
input from a number of stakeholders, including the NAACP, 
the federal government, and a number of southern states.224 
And in the wake of Brown II, after another decade of massive 
resistance, a political solution was finally arrived at in the 
form of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.225 The new era in structural 
reform may not be so new after all, for the historical path 
marked by Brown hews closely to the one described in this 
Article: an initial declaration followed by a court-imposed 
remedy, followed by politically crafted relief.226 But read in 
  
 221. Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 7-12 (2014) (urging 
an expansion of the civil rights canon beyond Brown to include the landmark 
statutes of the era as well). 
 222. 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954). 
 223. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 714 (1st 1976). 
 224. Id. at 723-36. 
 225. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (enacted July 2, 
1964). 
 226. Others have commented on this dynamic. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 16, 
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to buy time”); Gewirtz, supra note 21, at 610 (commenting on the meaning and 
function of the phrase, “all deliberate speed,” in Brown II). 
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this way, perhaps reformers can truly build a new way of 
doing justice. 
There will be inevitable resistance to this proposal, both 
from hard-driving litigators who have invested so much time, 
energy, and resources in the old way of litigating these cases, 
and from idealists who feel great affection for a remedy that 
has long served their reform goals well. The structural 
injunction will likely be with us for some time and hopefully 
will never entirely depart the scene. But as none other than 
Fiss reminds us, it “must be seen in instrumental terms.”227 
The structural injunction is not a goal in and of itself, but 
rather a means to an end. We must decouple the right from 
the remedy, lest the resistance to structural injunctions 
evolve into resistance to structural reform itself. 
  
 227. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 50. 
